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ABSTRACT
 
In several countries, girls are more likely than boys to be aborted, to die in infancy, or to 
have younger siblings, all of which signal that parents want sons.  However, standard techniques 
for measuring sex preferences fail to detect more subtle forms of sex preferences, especially 
when preferences are heterogeneous within a population.  The first chapter of this dissertation 
introduces a new framework for estimating heterogeneity in sex preferences using birth history 
records.  The framework selects among many possible combinations of preferences over the sex 
and number of children to best match observed childbearing.  Empirical estimates indicate that 
sex preferences are more widespread than previously reported and exhibit substantial 
heterogeneity within regions.  In Africa, this heterogeneity is associated with agricultural 
traditions that favor men or women. 
During the apartheid era, all South Africans were formally classified as white, African, 
coloured, or Asian.  Starting in 1970, the government directly provided free family planning 
services to residents of townships and white-owned farms.  The second chapter of this 
dissertation demonstrates that, relative to African residents of other regions of the country, the 
share of African women that gave birth in these townships and white-owned farms declined by 
nearly one-third during the 1970s.  Deferral of childbearing into the 1980s partially explains this 
decline, but lifetime fertility fell by one child per woman. 
The third chapter of this dissertation provides new evidence that family planning 
programs are associated with a decrease in the share of children and adults living in poverty.  
The chapter uses publicly-available census data to study the relationship between U.S. family 
planning programs in the late 1960s and early 1970s and short and longer-term poverty rates.  
Cohorts born after federal family planning programs began were less likely to live in poverty in 
childhood and in adulthood. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
Measuring Heterogeneity in Preferences over the Sex of Children 
 
1.1  Introduction 
 
Amartya Sen famously estimated that “more than 100 million women are missing” (Sen 
1990).  Due to abortion of girls, infanticide, and neglect, many of these women go missing at 
very young ages (Bongaarts and Guilmoto 2015).  Parents that want a son can also simply 
continue bearing children until they have a son.  Doing so concentrates girls in larger families in 
which resources are spread more thinly across many children (Jensen 2002).  In China, India, and 
several other countries in Asia, son preference leaves girls outnumbered and disadvantaged from 
a young age (Guilmoto 2012, World Bank 2015). 
Widespread son preference is less common outside of Asia.  Parents in the United States 
and several other countries tend to want a balance of sons and daughters, but in much of Africa 
and Latin America parents do not overwhelmingly want sons, daughters, or a balance of the two 
(Ben-Porath and Welch 1976, Arnold 1997, Angrist and Evans 1998, Bongaarts 2013).  Standard 
techniques for measuring sex preferences cannot identify whether even shares of parents in these 
regions prefer sons and daughters or parents generally do not care about the sex of their children 
(Haughton and Haughton 1998).  Such a distinction is crucial for understanding how gender, 
which is fundamental to many areas of economic and social activity (Munshi and Rosenzweig 
2006, Mammen 2008, Alesina et al. 2013, Goldin 2014), motivates childbearing decisions 
around the world. 
This paper introduces a revealed preference framework that, for the first time, measures 
heterogeneity in sex preferences within a population using a collection of birth histories.  The 
framework has three steps.  First, I develop a model of childbearing in which parents care about 
the share of children that are boys and the total number of children.  The model yields a set of 
possible childbearing strategies that govern the decision to have another child after each possible 
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sequence of sons and daughters.  Second, for a couple following each strategy, I calculate the 
likelihood that the couple stops childbearing after every possible sequence of sons and daughters.  
Third, I identify the combinations of strategies that best match an observed distribution of 
sequences of sons and daughters in completed families. 
The new framework quantifies the range of preferences over sex and number of children 
that are consistent with an observed population.  Crucially, the framework also measures the 
importance of the sex of children relative to the number of children.  This relative importance 
determines how a couple weighs potentially competing objectives over the sex and number of 
their children.  For example, a couple may want one child and prefer only sons, but whether the 
couple has a second child after a first-born daughter depends on the relative importance of 
having a small family versus having a son.  If the couple would always stop after one child 
regardless of the child’s sex, then the couple’s desire for a son has no bearing on its fertility 
decisions.  Sex preferences matter only if the sex of previous children influences the decision to 
have another child. 
Estimates using the new framework suggest that sex preferences are more widespread 
and heterogeneous than previously reported.  Using several large-scale birth history surveys from 
Africa, Asia, and the Americas, the new framework estimates that, for at least 40 percent of 
couples in each of these regions, the sex of previous children influences the decision to have 
additional children.  In Asia, son preference clearly dominates and at least half of parents want 
sons.  In Africa and the Americas, many parents want sons and many want daughters. 
Inheritance rules and other cultural characteristics contribute to widespread son 
preference in Asia (Das Gupta et al. 2003).  Greater heterogeneity in sex preferences in Africa 
and the Americas suggests variation within these regions in the conditions that shape sex 
preferences.  Africa comprises hundreds of ethnic groups that have a variety of male or female-
favoring traditional practices and cultural norms (Murdock 1959, Murdock 1967).  Estimates 
using the new framework identify pockets of son preference among ethnic groups in which land 
is traditionally inherited through the father’s line, agriculture is traditionally performed primarily 
by men, and the plow is traditionally used in agriculture.  Daughter preference is more common 
where inheritance of land follows matrilineal ties and women complete most agricultural tasks. 
Standard approaches for measuring sex preferences during childbearing model sex 
preferences according to stopping rules, in which a couple has a minimum number of children 
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and then continues bearing children until it has a target number of sons or daughters or until it 
reaches a maximum number of children (Sheps 1963, Keyfitz 1977, Seidl 1995, Jensen 2002, 
Basu and de Jong 2010).  These rules permit sex preferences to only inflate fertility: without sex 
preferences, each couple would not exceed their minimum number of children.  For this reason, 
weakened sex preferences are thought to yield declines in overall fertility levels (Mutharayappa 
et al. 1997).  The new framework in this paper more flexibly allows sex preferences to either 
inflate or deflate fertility levels: just as some couples may have additional children in order to 
have a son or daughter, other couples may stop childbearing early if they reach a particularly 
desirable combination of sons and daughters.  These two effects on fertility roughly offset in 
aggregate, and I estimate that eliminating all sex preferences would change overall fertility levels 
around the world by less than 0.2 children per couple.  Although sex preferences are widespread 
and govern many parents’ childbearing decisions, these estimates suggest that they do not drive 
overall fertility levels. 
I follow standard convention and refer to desire for sons or daughters as sex preferences.  
These preferences may result from a more fundamental optimization among the various tastes, 
incentives, and constraints that determine whether parents want sons or daughters.  Although I 
show that agricultural traditions in Africa are associated with son and daughter preference, I do 
not attempt to fully disentangle all components of sex preferences in this paper.  Additionally, 
men and women may have substantially different sex preferences (Robitaille 2013, Ashraf et al. 
2014), but large-scale birth history surveys are generally collected from women alone.  I do not 
address inter-partner bargaining over childbearing decisions in this paper and I refer to 
preferences as belonging to couples.  Finally, it is not possible to recover a couple’s preferences 
from its sequence of sons and daughters: when the sex of children is random, couples with the 
same preferences can have different sequences of sons and daughters, and couples with different 
preferences can have the same sequence (Haughton and Haughton 1998).  Only the distribution 
of preferences across a group of couples is discernible. 
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1.2  Sex Preferences and Parity Progression 
 
The likelihood that a conceived child is a boy can vary by ancestry and environmental 
conditions, but there remains no widely agreed-upon and adopted method by which parents can 
influence the sex of a fetus, and in all populations the natural likelihood that a conceived child is 
a boy is about 0.51 (Novitski and Sandler 1956, James 1971, Pickles et al. 1982, James 1990, 
Bongaarts 2013).  However, ultrasound and amniocentesis technologies allow parents to identify 
the sex of a fetus and make sex-selective abortion possible.  The share of births that are boys 
remained at or below 0.519 in all countries before 1980, but has since risen above 0.519 in 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, China, Georgia, India, Pakistan, South Korea, and Vietnam, suggesting 
substantial selective abortion of girls (World Bank 2015).  Girls in many of these countries are 
also more likely than boys to die in childhood (Arnold 1997, Bongaarts and Guilmoto 2015).  
Because no country exhibits corresponding selection against boys, the study of sex preferences 
during childbearing is overwhelmingly the study of son preference. 
Outside of Asia, the sex ratio at birth generally remains at the natural level.  Particularly 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, abortion is heavily stigmatized and infanticide is historically less 
common than in Asia (Maharaj and Cleland 2006, Kumar et al. 2009).  However, even where 
sex-selective abortion is rare, sex preferences may influence whether a couple continues 
childbearing after each son or daughter is born.  Many surveys ask parents to report whether they 
want another child or are using contraception, and these decisions signal sex preferences when 
they vary according to the sex of previous children (Bongaarts 2013, Milazzo 2014).  However, 
surveys generally record these decisions over a limited time frame, such as since the birth of a 
parent’s most recent child.  Many more surveys record the order and sex of all of a parent’s live 
births.  These birth history surveys offer the most comprehensive account of a parent’s 
childbearing career.  In this paper, I focus on inferring sex preferences using these sequences of 
sons and daughters. 
Sex preferences shape the distribution of children across families.  For example, consider 
a population with son preference in which all couples continue childbearing until they have a son 
or until they have two children.  If every birth is a boy with likelihood one-half, then half of 
couples have a first-born son and stop, one-quarter have a daughter and then a son, and one-
quarter have two daughters.  Several characteristics of this distribution are commonly cited as 
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signals that parents prefer sons (Park 1983, Yamaguchi 1989, Seidl 1995, Clark 2000, Jensen 
2002, Conley and Glauber 2006, Basu and de Jong 2010, Chaudhuri 2012).  Table 1.1 calculates 
standard measures of sex preferences for several hypothetical populations.  Column 1 presents 
these measures for the hypothetical population with son preference.  No boy in this hypothetical 
population has a younger sibling while two-thirds of girls have a younger sibling.  Boys have 
one-third of a sibling on average while every girl has one sibling.  The overall sex ratio remains 
one boy for every girl, but three-quarters of last-born children are boys and the average share of 
sons per family is five-eighths.  Parity progression ratios, which measure the share of couples 
with a particular sequence of children that have another child, are greater for couples with one 
daughter than for couples with one son, suggesting that parents are generally not satisfied with 
having only a daughter. 
Of these statistics, parity progression ratios best measure sex preferences when not all 
couples have the same preference.  In population 2 in Table 1.1, all couples have daughter 
preference and keep childbearing until they have a daughter or until they have three children.  In 
population 3, 60 percent of couples come from population 1 and have son preference, and the 
remaining 40 percent come from population 2 and have daughter preference.  Boys and girls in 
this mixed population are equally likely to have a younger sibling and the share of last-born 
children that are boys is one-half, both of which fail to indicate son or daughter preference.  Boys 
have more siblings on average than do girls, suggesting that parents want daughters, but the 
average share of sons per family is greater than one-half, suggesting that parents want sons.  
Parity progression ratios better explain the mixture of preferences in this population: couples 
with one daughter are more likely than couples with one son to have a second child, while 
couples with two sons are most likely to have a third child, suggesting that son preference 
dominates among parents deciding whether to have a second child and daughter preference 
dominates among parents deciding whether to have a third child. 
In actual populations, parity progression ratios exhibit substantial variation.  For the main 
empirical analyses in this paper, I compile birth histories collected by the following seven large 
surveys: China’s 1988 Fertility Survey (the “Two-per-thousand” survey), Demographic and 
Health Surveys, India’s 1982 Rural Economic and Demographic Survey, Japanese General 
Social Surveys, United States Integrated Fertility Survey Series, Multiple Indicator Cluster 
Surveys, and World Fertility Surveys (see Table 1.2).  As depicted in Figure 1.1, these surveys 
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offer substantial coverage in Africa, Asia, North America, and South America.  The sample is 
restricted to women aged 40 and above to plausibly identify completed families.  As given in 
Table 1.3, parity progression ratios on each continent vary among women with the same number 
of children.  For example, 86.7 percent of women in North America with two sons have a third 
child, which is 1.5 percentage points higher than women with two daughters, 2.2 percentage 
points higher than women with a son and then a daughter, and 2.9 percentage points higher than 
women with a daughter and then a son. 
The goal of this paper is to explain the childbearing behavior that drives observed 
variation in parity progression ratios within populations.  First, to gauge whether sampling error 
alone can explain observed variation, I use a binomial test of the null hypothesis that all couples 
in a population with the same number of children are equally likely to have another child.  For 
example, as given in Table 1.3, 95.5 percent of women observed in Asia with one son have a 
second child, and 95.8 percent of women with one daughter have a second child.  Table 1.4 
demonstrates that, if all women observed in Asia were equally likely to have a second child, the 
likelihood is less than 0.001 that at most 95.5 percent of women with one son would have a 
second child.  Likewise, the likelihood is less than 0.001 that at least 95.8 percent of women with 
one daughter would have a second child.  Sampling error alone similarly cannot explain 
observed variation in parity progression ratios in Asia after two children and after three children.  
In Africa and the Americas, sampling error could explain variation in parity progression after the 
first child but not after the second and third child.  As given in Figure 1.2, the same binomial test 
indicates that sampling error alone cannot account for observed variation in parity progression 
ratios after the first, second, or third child in most of the 94 countries in the compiled dataset. 
Because sampling error alone cannot explain all of the observed variation in parity 
progression ratios, at least some parents on each continent must make childbearing decisions that 
depend on the sex of previous children.  As given in Table 1.3, couples in Asia that have only 
daughters are more likely to have another child than are couples with the same number of 
children that have only sons.  However, not all couples stop after having a son.  For example, 
21.2 percent couples in Asia with three sons have another child.  Similarly, in each of the other 
three continents, parity progression is greatest for couples with only sons or only daughters, but 
substantial shares of couples that already have a son and daughter go on to have another child. 
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This observed variation in parity progression ratios suggests that sex preferences in actual 
populations are more heterogeneous than in the simulated populations in Table 1.1.  Table 1.3 
does not clearly signal whether a minority of parents have strong sex preferences or a majority of 
parents have relatively weaker sex preferences.  Especially outside of Asia, some couples may 
not care about the sex of children while others prefer sons, daughters, or a balance of sons and 
daughters.  Some couples may want many children while others want just one or two.  As noted 
by Ben-Porath and Welch (1976, page 292), “If populations are heterogeneous … observed 
patterns will be blurred.” 
In the next section, I introduce a new framework for measuring this heterogeneity.  
Standard techniques calculate single statistics from the distribution of sequences of children 
across families – statistics that reliably signal sex preferences only when most parents have the 
same preferences.  The new framework instead starts by specifying a set of possible preferences 
that parents can have, and then identifies the combinations of preferences that best explain the 
entire distribution of sequences of children across completed families in an observed population.  
Although point identification of sex preferences is generally not possible, the new framework 
identifies meaningfully narrow bounds on preferences that indicate that many parents in Africa 
and the Americas prefer sons while many others prefer daughters. 
 
1.3  A New Framework for Measuring Heterogeneity in Sex Preferences 
 
This section introduces a three-step framework for measuring heterogeneity in sex 
preferences during childbearing.  First, I define a set of possible childbearing strategies.  Second, 
I calculate the likelihood that a couple following each strategy has each possible sequence of 
sons and daughters.  Third, I identify the combinations of strategies that best explain the 
observed distribution of sequences of sons and daughters in a population. 
A childbearing strategy is a rule governing the decision to have another child after every 
possible realization of sons and daughters.  For example, a couple has one child, has a second 
child only if the first-born child is a daughter, and never has a third child.  This strategy fits 
within a stopping rule model of childbearing in which a couple has a minimum number of 
children and then continues bearing children until it has a target number of sons or daughters or 
until it reaches a maximum number of children.  Stopping rules only permit sex preferences to 
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inflate fertility above the minimum, which is the number of children the couple would have 
absent any son or daughter targets (McClelland 1979). 
This section develops an alternative model of childbearing in which preferences over the 
ideal share of children that are boys and ideal number of children determine childbearing 
strategies.  The model highlights the tradeoff between sex and number of children.  While trying 
to improve upon an undesirable combination of sons and daughters, a couple may have more 
than its ideal number of children.  Alternatively, a couple with a particularly desirable 
combination of sons and daughters may stop childbearing before reaching its ideal number of 
children.  The model therefore more flexibly permits sex preferences to inflate or deflate fertility.  
Table 1.5 demonstrates that the model nests common stopping rules. 
The new framework assumes that the likelihood that each birth is a boy is stochastic and 
the same across all couples.  Sex-selective abortion violates this assumption, and I exclude from 
the compiled dataset women who were of childbearing age after 1980 and live in a country in 
which sex-selective abortion has been widespread.  Couples may also vary in their natural 
likelihoods of having a boy, but this variation is small (James 2009).  For the main results, I 
assume that each child is a boy with likelihood 0.51, and I demonstrate the robustness of the 
empirical estimates to changes in this assumption. 
 
1.3.1  Define a Set of Possible Childbearing Strategies 
 
I assume that all couples have the same number of childbearing periods, T, and face the 
same likelihood that each child is a boy, l.  In each period, a couple tries or does not try to have a 
child.  These two options approximate the range of effort that couples may actually exert to 
become or avoid becoming pregnant.  The couple then has a son, a daughter, or no child (there 
are no twin births).  All couples have the same likelihood of conception when trying to get 
pregnant, p, and when not trying, q.  All conceived children are carried to full term.  Therefore, a 
couple that tries to get pregnant has a son with likelihood pl, a daughter with likelihood p(1–l), 
and no child with likelihood 1–p.  A couple that does not try to get pregnant has a son with 
likelihood ql, a daughter with likelihood q(1–l), and no child with likelihood 1–q.  Later, I 
discuss sensitivity of the main estimates to specifications of these parameters. 
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After the last childbearing period, a couple receives additively-separable utility from the 
share of children that are sons and the total number of children.  The couple cares only about 
their total numbers of sons and daughters, not the order in which they were born.  The couple has 
three preferences: ideal share of children that are sons, r*, ideal number of children, c*, and 
importance of the sex of children relative to the number of children, α.  I consider a discrete 
number of possible values for these preferences: r*∈{0, 0.1, 0.2, …, 1}, c*∈{0, 1, 2, …, T}, and 
α∈{0, 0.1, 0.2, …, 1}. 
A couple may not be able to simultaneously reach its ideal share of children that are boys 
and ideal number of children.  The relative importance of the sex of children determines how the 
couple trades off these competing goals and captures the degree to which sex preferences affect 
childbearing decisions.  A couple may consider only the number of children (α=0), only the sex 
of children (α=1), or both (0<α<1) when deciding whether to have additional children.  
Sequential childbearing decisions are therefore fundamentally economic, balancing competing 
desires (the sex and number of children) under constraints (a finite number of childbearing 
periods and the randomness of the sex of each child). 
A couple’s childbearing decisions are governed by the following Bellman equation: 
 
  V(𝑠, 𝑑, 𝑇 − 𝑡) = Max{𝐸𝑉try, 𝐸𝑉¬try}, where             (1) 
               𝐸𝑉try = 𝑝𝑙𝑉(𝑠 + 1, 𝑑, 𝑡 + 1) + 𝑝(1 − 𝑙)𝑉(𝑠, 𝑑 + 1, 𝑡 + 1) + (1 − 𝑝)𝑉(𝑠, 𝑑, 𝑡 + 1) 
             𝐸𝑉¬try = 𝑞𝑙𝑉(𝑠 + 1, 𝑑, 𝑡 + 1) + 𝑞(1 − 𝑙)𝑉(𝑠, 𝑑 + 1, 𝑡 + 1) + (1 − 𝑞)𝑉(𝑠, 𝑑, 𝑡 + 1)  
 𝑉(𝑠, 𝑑, 𝑇 + 1) = {
−𝛼 (
𝑠
𝑠+𝑑
− 𝑟∗)
2
− (1 − 𝛼)(𝑠 + 𝑑 − 𝑐∗)2    if 𝑠 + 𝑑 > 0  
−𝛼                       − (1 − 𝛼)𝑐∗2                        if 𝑠 = 𝑑 = 0.
 
 
In every childbearing period t = 1, 2, …, T, the couple tries or does not try to have a child in 
order to maximize expected utility at the end of its childbearing career (period T+1).  If trying 
and not trying to have a child yield the same expected utility, the couple tries to have a child.  
The decision in each period depends on the number of sons, s, and daughters, d, to which the 
couple has already given birth.  The couple receives bliss-point utility in period T+1 equal to the 
sum of the squared difference between the actual and ideal share of children that are boys and the 
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squared difference between the actual and ideal number of children.  The importance of the sex 
of children relative to the number of children, α, weights these two terms. 
 
1.3.2  For Each Strategy, Calculate the Likelihood of Each Sequence of Children 
 
Equation 1 is solved using backward induction.  In period T, a couple tries to have a child 
if and only if the expected utility from trying to having a child weakly exceeds the expected 
utility from not trying to have a child.  When facing the same choices in period T–1, the couple 
knows, for each possible outcome, what its decision will be in period T.  Similar calculations 
govern decisions in all earlier periods.  The set of decisions after all possible realizations of sons 
and daughters constitutes a childbearing strategy. 
For example, assume that a couple faces two childbearing periods and an even chance 
that each child is a boy (T=2, l=½), has perfect control over conception (p=1, q=0), and cares 
only that all children are sons (α=1, r*=1, c* does not matter and can take any value).  In the first 
period, the couple has a child.  If the first-born child is a son, additional children cannot raise and 
might reduce the share of children that are sons, so the couple does not have a second child.  If 
the first-born child is a daughter, a second child cannot reduce and might raise the share of 
children that are sons, so the couple has a second child.  Therefore, with likelihood l the couple 
has a son, with likelihood (1–l)l the couple has a daughter and then a son, and with likelihood  
(1–l)(1–l) the couple has two daughters.  The couple has no chance of having any other sequence 
of children.   
Imperfect control over conception is the only reason to defer childbearing.  For example, 
assume that a couple faces two childbearing periods and an even chance that each child is a boy 
(T=2, l=½), can get pregnant when trying but faces some chance of accidentally becoming 
pregnant when not trying (p=1, 0<q<1), and wants one child regardless of its sex (α=0, c*=1, r* 
does not matter).  A couple that tries to have a child in the first period will always succeed.  
Because the couple has reached its ideal number of children, the couple stops trying to have 
children, but with likelihood q the couple accidentally has another child in the second period.  If 
the couple instead waits until the second period to try to have a child, with likelihood q the 
couple has a child in the first period, and then again with likelihood q the couple has a child in 
the second period.  In this case, the couple has two children with likelihood q2.  Because q2<q, 
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waiting to try to conceive lessens the risk of having two children.  Knowing that it can always 
have a child if it wishes to, the couple defers trying to have a child until the second period. 
Parents may actually defer childbearing for education, employment, marriage, and other 
reasons.  Women who have their first child late in their fecund years may in fact have perfect 
control over conception, but the model introduced in Section 1.3.1 interprets this deferral as 
resulting from concern over the likelihood of conception.  For each combination of preferences, 
the model generates an expected distribution over the full sequence of periods in which a boy, 
girl, or no child is born.  To avoid misinterpreting the timing of births, I collapse this distribution 
to the sequence of sons and daughters, as given in Table 1.6.  Shorter spacing after the birth of 
daughters signals that parents in some countries are eager to have sons.  Because girls are 
breastfed for less time than boys, shorter spacing can reduce the chance that girls survive infancy 
(Jayachandran and Kuziemko 2011).  Collapsing to the sequence of sons and daughters avoids 
misinterpreting the timing of childbearing, but at a cost of ignoring information about spacing 
between births. 
 
1.3.3  Identify the Combinations of Strategies that Best Explain an Observed Population 
 
Given T childbearing periods, there are N=121(T+1) possible strategies (defined by each 
combination of preferences r*, c*, and α) and M=2T+1–1 possible sequences of sons and 
daughters.  A is an M×N matrix in which each element amn is the likelihood that a couple with 
combination of preferences n has order of children m.  D is an M×1 matrix in which each 
element dm is the share of couples with sequence of children m in an observed population.  For 
example, consider a large population in which half of couples have a single son, one-quarter 
have a daughter and then a son, and one-quarter have two daughters.  Assuming two childbearing 
periods, an even chance that each child is a son, and perfect control over conception (T=2, l=½, 
p=1, q=0), Table 1.7 defines A and D. 
The goal of this section is to determine the share of couples with each combination of 
preferences that best explains an observed distribution of sequences of children.  If all couples 
follow the final strategy listed in A in Table 1.7 (r*=1, c*=2, α=1), then half of couples will have 
one son, one-quarter will have a daughter and then a son, and one-quarter will have two 
daughters.  This distribution exactly matches the actual observed distribution of sequences of 
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children, D.  However, if all couples follow the next-to-last strategy listed in A (r*=1, c*=2, 
α=0.9), the resulting population will also exactly match the observed population.  Figure 1.3 
describes the combinations of strategies that each exactly match the observed population.  The 
dots in panels (b) through (f) each represent a population in which all parents have the same 
preferences.  In each of these populations, the expected distribution of sequences of children 
exactly matches the observed population.  For example, the final strategy listed in A in Table 1.7 
(r*=1, c*=2, α=1) exactly matches the observed population and is given by the dot in the upper-
right corner of panel (f). 
Each vertex of the three-dimensional object in panel (g) corresponds to a dot in panels (b) 
through (f) and is a unique combination of preferences that, in expectation, exactly matches the 
observed population.  Because any population that consists of combinations of couples following 
any of these unique strategies also exactly matches the observed population, the polyhedron in 
panel (g) is a convex set of all possible combinations of average values of r*, c*, and α that 
exactly match the observed population.  Each of the polygons in panels (c) through (f) provide 
slices of the polyhedron in panel (g), holding average r* constant. 
This example is a specific case when at least one combination of preferences yields a 
predicted distribution over all possible sequences of sons and daughters that exactly matches the 
observed distribution of children in completed families.  In the more general case when no 
strategy exactly matches the observed population, it is not possible to create a polyhedron, as in 
panel (g), formed by vertices that represent single strategies.  The edges of the convex hull may 
be determined by an infinite number of combinations of preferences.  In this section, I develop a 
two-stage procedure for calculating bounds on the average values of preferences without 
determining the entire convex hull, and later I adapt the procedure to estimate additional 
summary measures. 
The first stage identifies the smallest difference between observed and predicted 
populations: 
 
Min
𝐒𝑁×1
 𝐖1×𝑀
T |𝐃𝑀×1 − 𝐀𝑀×𝑁𝐒𝑁×1|                                                            (2) 
  s. t. 𝟎𝑁×1 ≤ 𝐒𝑁×1 
𝟏1×𝑁𝐒𝑁×1 = 1. 
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The candidate share, S, is an N×1 matrix in which each element sn is the estimated share of 
couples with combination of preferences n.  Minimum value function 2 (which I refer to as 
equation 2) chooses a candidate share that minimizes the sum of absolute deviations between the 
observed population, D, and the predicted population, AS, subject to the constraints that the 
shares of parents with each combination of preferences are non-negative and sum to 1.  Each 
deviation is weighted according to an M×1 matrix W.  Throughout this paper I assign equal 
weight to all orders of children (W=1).  Equation 2 identifies the smallest possible sum of 
absolute deviations between the observed and predicted populations, 𝑒min=WT|D–AS|.  I use the 
sum of absolute deviations so that this minimized sum can enter as a linear constraint in the 
second stage. 
The second stage calculates bounds on average values of each preference across all 
candidate shares that best match the observed population: 
 
Min
𝐒𝑁×1
 𝐅1×𝑁
T 𝐒𝑁×1                                                                                        (3) 
  s. t. 𝟎𝑁×1 ≤ 𝐒𝑁×1 
𝟏1×𝑁𝐒𝑁×1 = 1 
𝐖1×𝑀
T |𝐃𝑀×1 − 𝐀𝑀×𝑁𝐒𝑁×1| = 𝑒
min. 
 
F is a N×1 matrix in which each element fn is a characteristic of strategy n.  For example, if each 
fn equals the ideal share of children that are boys in corresponding strategy n, then equation 3 
chooses a candidate share that minimizes FTS, the average ideal share of children that are boys 
across all strategies.  In addition to the same proportionality constraints as in equation 2, 
equation 3 requires that the sum of absolute deviations using the chosen candidate share equals 
the minimized sum of absolute deviations from the first stage.  I use the linear programming 
simplex algorithm to solve equations 2 and 3. 
The minimized value of FTS from equation 3 provides the minimum average ideal share 
of children that are sons across all combinations of strategies that best explain the observed 
population.  Similarly, setting each element of F to equal the ideal number of children or relative 
importance of the sex of children in the corresponding strategy permits calculations of the 
minimum average values of these preferences across all combinations of strategies that best 
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explain the observed population.  Finally, multiplying F by –1 and rerunning equation 3 yields 
the maximum average value of these preferences, –FTS. 
Figure 1.4 provides the estimated bounds on the average values of the three preferences 
for each of the simulated populations in Table 1.1, calculated assuming three childbearing 
periods, an even chance that each child is a boy, and perfect control over conception (T=3, l=½, 
p=1, q=0).  Panel (a) indicates that the average ideal share of children that are boys is at least 0.6 
in population 1, is at most 0.2 in population 2, and is between 0.1 and 0.75 in population 3.  
(Again, because of collinearity of strategies, it is possible to bound but not point identify 
preferences.)  The distribution of sequences of children in completed families shapes these 
estimated bounds.  For example, half of couples in population 1 have just one son but no couple 
has just one daughter, suggesting that parents are satisfied with sons but not with daughters.  
These estimates are consistent with parity progression ratios that suggest son preference in 
population 1, daughter preference in population 2, and no clear overall son or daughter 
preference in population 3. 
Panel (b) of Figure 1.4 indicates that the average ideal number of children could be 
between 0 and 1 in population 1, between 0 and 3 in population 2, and between 0 and 1.8 in 
population 3.  The upper bound on this range is lowest in population 1 because there are three 
childbearing periods yet no couple has more than two children, indicating unwillingness to have 
a third child in order to have a son.  In contrast, some couples in population 2 and population 3 
do have three children. 
Panel (c) of Figure 1.4 indicates that, on average, the relative importance that couples 
place on the sex of children is between 0.8 and 0.9 in population 1, between 0.9 and 1 in 
population 2, and between 0.5 and 0.95 in population 3.  Although it is not possible to identify 
whether parents in population 3 generally prefer sons or daughters, these estimates demonstrate 
that parents in population 3 care about the sex of their children.  Within each population, the 
range of possible values in panel (c) shapes the bounds on estimates in panels (a) and (b).  For 
example, if all parents in population 2 care only about the sex of their children, then their 
preferences over ideal number of children do not matter and can range anywhere from zero to 
three.  If all parents instead care about both the sex and number of children, the bounds on 
average ideal number of children that best explains observed childbearing narrow. 
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1.4  Main Results: Estimates of Preferences Using the New Framework 
 
I solve equation 1 using the following quantities: eight childbearing periods, a likelihood 
of 0.51 that each child is a boy, a likelihood of 0.9 that a couple conceives when trying to get 
pregnant, and a likelihood of 0.1 that a couple conceives when not trying to get pregnant (T=8, 
l=0.51, p=0.9, q=0.1).  Childbearing is limited to eight periods to facilitate computation of 
equations 1 through 3.  Larsen (2005) reports that approximately 90% of women in northern 
Tanzania are able to get pregnant within two years when trying.  However, access to 
contraception and other factors that influence control over conception can vary across 
populations, across couples within a population, and over time for individual couples (Henry 
1961, Di Renzo et al. 2007, Clifton 2010).  Section 4.2 examines the sensitivity of the empirical 
estimates to the specification of these parameters. 
I limit the sample of women aged 40 and above introduced in Section 1.2 to women that 
gave birth eight or fewer times and do not have any twin births.  For countries in which the share 
of births that are boys has ever exceeded 0.519 since 1980 (Armenia, Azerbaijan, China, 
Georgia, India, Pakistan, South Korea, and Vietnam), I exclude women that reached age 40 after 
1980.  I calculate the distribution of sequences of children on each continent using weights that 
accompany each survey, with each survey’s weight rescaled to have a mean value of one. 
 
1.4.1  Estimated Bounds on Average Values of Preferences 
 
The dark rectangles in panel (a) of Figure 1.5 provide estimated bounds on the average 
ideal share of children that are boys on each continent, calculated using the new framework.  The 
light rectangles provide 95-percent confidence intervals around the unknown true average value, 
calculated using subsampling following Romano and Shaikh (2008) with 1,000 subsamples.  The 
coefficient of determination next to each continent’s name is calculated according to McKean 
and Sievers (1987).  These estimates indicate that the average ideal share of children that are 
boys is between 0.25 and 0.9 in Africa, between 0.52 and 0.97 in Asia, between 0.2 and 0.8 in 
North America, and between 0.3 and 0.8 in South America.  The estimates in panel (b) indicate 
that the average ideal number of children is roughly five in Africa, just above four in Asia, and 
less than four in the Americas.  (Again, younger women that live in high-sex ratio countries are 
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excluded from these estimates.  Because these women are concentrated in Asia and generally 
have few children, the actual average ideal number of children across all women in Asia is likely 
much less than four.)  The estimates in panel (c) indicate that the average relative importance of 
the sex of children is between about 0.2 and 0.8 in Africa and the Americas and between 0.4 and 
0.85 in Asia.  The coefficients of variation indicate that the framework explains 94 percent of 
observed variation in sequences of children across families in Africa, Asia, and North America, 
and 95 percent of observed variation in South America. 
Variation in parity progression ratios, and corresponding variation in the distribution of 
sequences of children in completed families, drives these estimates.  As discussed in Section 1.2, 
this variation indicates that the sex of previous children is associated with the choice to have 
additional children.  For this reason, the new framework estimates that the average relative 
importance of the sex of children is greater than zero on all continents.  As given in Table 1.3, 
couples in Asia are most likely to have another child when all previous children are girls.  For 
example, couples with three daughters are 9 percentage points more likely to have another child 
than are couples with three sons (76 percent compared to 67 percent).  Because no other 
continent exhibits correspondingly stark parity progression ratios in favor of one sex, only in 
Asia does the new framework conclude that parents on average favor a particular sex. 
 
1.4.2  Robustness of Estimates to Specification of Model Parameters and Sample Definition 
 
Figure 1.6 demonstrates the sensitivity of estimated bounds on average values of 
preferences in Africa to choice of model parameters.  The solid rectangles provide the identified 
set under the main specification, and the hollow rectangles under alternative specifications.  As 
the number of childbearing periods permitted rises and women with greater numbers of children 
are included in the sample, the average ideal number of children increases and the bounds on sex 
preferences narrow.  As the assumed likelihood that each birth is a boy rises, the upper and lower 
bounds on average ideal share of children that are boys fall slightly, but the bounds on the 
average ideal number of children and the average relative importance of the sex of children 
remain roughly the same.  For various specifications of the increment between each possible r* 
and between each possible α, sex preferences also remain roughly consistent.  In all cases, the 
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specification used in the main results best explains observed childbearing (coefficient of 
determination equal to 0.94). 
Figure 1.7 demonstrates that estimated bounds on average preferences vary substantially 
across different assumed specifications of control over conception.  The bounds are widest when 
the likelihood of conception when trying to get pregnant is low (p=0.8 or p=0.7) or when the 
likelihood of conception when not trying to get pregnant is low (q=0).  The bounds are narrower 
and remain roughly stable using larger values of these parameters.  As in Figure 1.6, the 
parameters used in the main specification (likelihood of conception 0.9 when trying to get 
pregnant and 0.1 when not trying to get pregnant) best explain observed childbearing in Africa 
(coefficient of determination equal to 0.94).  Figure 1.7 therefore suggests that parents face a 
small likelihood of infecundity and a small likelihood of accidentally becoming pregnant.  This 
imperfect control over conception introduces some randomness into actual sequences of sons and 
daughters.  A model that assumes perfect control over conception cannot account for this 
randomness and struggles to explain observed childbearing.  By allowing for imperfect control 
over conception, the new framework better explains observed variation in sequences of sons and 
daughters across families. 
Figure 1.8 demonstrates that the estimated bounds on average preferences remain stable 
as the minimum age at observation rises from 40 to 44.  Estimates are also stable across currently 
and previously-married women, but widen considerably among never-married women.  Finally, 
the main sample retains all live births, and estimates vary only slightly across samples that 
exclude children who died before one month of age, before their first birthday, before their fifth 
birthday, or before the birth of their next sibling.  However, the coefficient of determination rises 
slightly as deceased children are excluded. 
 
1.4.3  Additional Summary Measures of Sex Preferences 
 
Section 3.3 presents a two-stage optimization procedure for estimating bounds on the 
average ideal share of children that are boys, the average ideal number of children, and the 
average relative importance of the sex of children across all couples.  This section adapts the 
procedure to consider four additional summary measures: Prevalence, equal to the share of 
couples that place any importance on the sex of children (α>0); WantBalance, equal to the share 
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of couples want a balance of sons and daughters (r*=½); WantSons, equal to the share of couples 
that want more than half of their children to be sons (r*>½); and WantDaughters, equal to the 
share of couples that want more than half of their children to be daughters (r*<½).  These 
summary measures are calculated using alternative specifications of F in equations 2 and 3.  For 
example, to estimate the prevalence of sex preferences, each element of F equals 1 if the 
corresponding strategy places any weight on the sex of children (α>0) and equals 0 otherwise. 
The binomial test in Section 1.2 demonstrates that sex preferences are discernible on all 
four continents, but the test cannot identify the share of parents that make childbearing decisions 
that depend on the sex of previous children.  As presented in panel (a) of Figure 1.9, the new 
framework estimates that the prevalence of sex preferences is at least 0.4 on all continents.  For 
at least 40 percent of parents, the sex of previous children influences future childbearing 
decisions.  In Asia, Africa, and the Americas, sex preferences are widespread and not 
concentrated among a small group of parents. 
Panel (c) of Figure 1.9 indicates that at least half of couples in Asia prefer sons to 
daughters, confirming earlier studies that document extensive son preference in Asia.  
Elsewhere, sex preferences are heterogeneous.  As given in panel (b), at most about 60 percent of 
couples in Africa and the Americas want a balance of sons and daughters.  As given in panels (c) 
and (d), the identified bounds on the shares of couples that prefer sons and prefer daughters are 
wide, but the lower bounds are substantially greater than zero: at least 15 percent of couples in 
these continents prefer sons, and at least 10 percent prefer daughters.  Together, these estimates 
suggest that many parents outside of Asia prefer sons to daughters and many others prefer 
daughters to sons. 
 
1.4.4  Comparison between Estimated and Reported Sex Preferences 
 
Preferences estimated using the new framework can be compared with attitudinal surveys 
that elicit stated preferences.  Many Demographic and Health Surveys ask women to report the 
number of sons and number of daughters they would choose if they could return to the start of 
their childbearing careers (Arnold 1997).  Using a sample of women that both provide birth 
histories and report their ideal numbers of sons and daughters, Figure 1.10 compares estimated 
bounds on average values of preferences, given by hollow rectangles, and average reported 
19 
preferences, given by dark circles.  Panel (a) suggests that parents generally over-report desire 
for a balance of sons and daughters.  On each continent, the upper bound on the estimated share 
of parents that want an even balance of sons and daughters (r*=½) is below the share of women 
that report wanting an even balance of sons and daughters.  For example, the new framework 
estimates that at most 52 percent of couples in Africa want a balance of sons and daughters, yet 
60 percent of women in Africa report wanting a balance of sons and daughters. 
Panel (b) of Figure 1.10 suggests that women under-report the strength of their 
preferences.  Bounds on the strength of sex preferences are again estimated using equations 2 
and 3, with each element of F set to equal the magnitude of the difference between the ideal 
share of children that are boys and one-half, |r*–½|, in the corresponding strategy.  The estimated 
lower bound on the strength of preferences is at least 0.2 on all continents, substantially greater 
than the average reported magnitude of 0.09 in Africa and Asia and 0.14 in the Americas. 
One potential explanation for the disparity between reported and estimated preferences is 
that the reported preferences in Figure 1.10 are collected from women alone while actual 
childbearing  reflects a combination of women’s and men’s preferences.  However, reported son 
preference in India is often as strong or stronger among women than among men (Robitaille 
2013).  As discussed by Bongaarts (2013), sensitive questions that directly elicit sex preferences 
are particularly prone to misreporting.  Additionally, these attitudinal surveys do not address the 
sequential nature of childbearing.  A couple’s decision to have another child depends not only on 
its ideal composition of sons and daughters but also on the relative undesirability of other 
combinations of sons and daughters. 
 
1.5  Traditional Agricultural Practices and Sex Preferences in Africa 
 
Previous studies find evidence of substantial son preference in Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Egypt, Nigeria and a few other countries in Africa (Bongaarts 2013, Milazzo 2014).  
However, most countries in Africa do not exhibit clear son preference or clear daughter 
preference (Arnold 1997).  The bounds on the average ideal share of children that are boys in 
panel (a) of Figure 1.5 confirm this general conclusion, but the additional summary measures in 
Figure 1.9 suggest that there is substantial heterogeneity: many parents in Africa choose to have 
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another child depending on the sex of previous children, with some parents preferring sons and 
others preferring daughters. 
This section measures sex preferences by ethnic group affiliation.  Africa comprises 
hundreds of ethnic groups.  The anthropologist George Murdock drew from thousands of reports 
and other documents to generate a map of historical ethnic group boundaries in Africa and a 
database of pre-colonial characteristics of many of these groups (Murdock 1959, 1967).  
Economists have used this information to study the development of institutions in Africa and 
their relationship with economic growth (Fenske 2009, Bolt 2010, Nunn and Wantchekon 2011, 
Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2014).  Alesina et al. (2013) use Murdock’s database to show 
that, consistent with the Boserup hypothesis that plow-based cultivation gives men an advantage 
in agricultural production, areas in which the plow was traditionally used in agriculture tend to 
have more male-favoring gender norms today. 
Alesina et al. (2013) do not address sex preferences during childbearing, but others have 
examined the relationship between traditional cultural characteristics and desire for sons in Asia.  
Das Gupta et al. (2003) find that son preference is widespread where inheritance passes through 
patrilineal ties and a bride’s family pays a dowry at marriage.  Although dowry is rarely paid in 
Africa, there is substantial variety, even across ethnic groups located in the same country, in 
whether inheritance of land traditionally follows patrilineal or matrilineal ties and whether men 
or women traditionally perform most agricultural tasks.  For example, among the Ewe of Ghana, 
Togo, and Benin, patrilineal heirs inherit land.  Among the Ashanti of Ghana, matrilineal heirs 
inherit land.  In Kenya, men traditionally perform most agricultural tasks in Boran regions, while 
women do so in Kamba areas (Murdock 1959, 1967). 
Many Demographic and Health Surveys that collect birth histories also report the location 
of each cluster of respondents.  Figure 1.11 provides the distribution of these clusters by ethnic 
group characteristic, as determined using Murdock (1959, 1967).  The top row presents the 
location of respondents living in areas where inheritance of land traditionally passes through 
patrilineal ties, agriculture is traditionally performed primarily by men, and the plow is 
traditionally used in agriculture.  These characteristics all imply incentives for having sons.  The 
bottom row provides the location of respondents living in areas with traditional characteristics 
that imply incentives for having daughters.  Historical use of the plow is concentrated in North 
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Africa and Ethiopia, but the other two characteristics exhibit substantial variation, particularly 
within West, Central, and East Africa. 
These traditional agricultural practices are associated with sex preferences during 
childbearing.  Figure 1.12 presents estimated bounds on the share of couples that want more sons 
than daughters minus the share that want more daughters than sons, with couples grouped 
according to agricultural tradition.  Again, these estimates are calculated using the procedure in 
Section 1.3.3, with each element of F set equal to 0 if the corresponding strategy represents 
balance preference (r*=½), 1 if the strategy represents son preference (r*>½), and –1 if the 
strategy represents daughter preference (r*<½).  Where inheritance of land traditionally follows 
patrilineal ties, agriculture is traditionally performed primarily by men, or the plow is 
traditionally used in agriculture, couples today generally prefer sons.  Where agricultural 
traditions favor women, couples generally prefer daughters. 
Variation in the distribution of sequences of children in completed families drives these 
estimates.  For example, where inheritance traditionally passes through patrilineal ties, 5.8 
percent of couples stop after having two daughters and 7.1 percent stop after having two sons.  
Where inheritance follows matrilineal ties, the shares are reversed: 7.1 percent of couples stop 
after having two daughters but just 6.4 percent stop after having two sons.  Although the 
identified sets for each pair of estimates in Figure 1.12 overlap and it is not possible to rule out 
that the direction of sex preferences is the same in each pair, these estimates suggest that 
agricultural traditions are associated with sex preferences today.  Diversity in incentives for 
having sons and daughters crosses country borders and is consistent with variation in whether 
parents want sons or daughters. 
 
1.6  Effect of Sex Preferences on Fertility Levels 
 
High fertility can have several adverse consequences.  Having many children raises the 
chance that a woman will die during childbirth, a risk that is exacerbated by a high likelihood of 
maternal death per childbirth in many countries that also have high fertility rates (Stanton et al. 
2000).  Parents with many children tend to invest less in each child’s education, leading to poorer 
labor market achievement for these children in adulthood (Lloyd and Brandon 1994, Pop-
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Eleches 2006).  Rapid population growth unaccompanied by technological development can also 
place Malthusian pressure on food resources (Galor and Weil 2000, Hansen and Prescott 2002). 
Mutharayappa et al. (1997), Bhat and Zavier (2003), and others propose that weakening 
sex preferences may foster declines in fertility by giving parents less incentive to have many 
children.  This conclusion stems from the stopping rule model of sex preferences, in which 
parents exceed their desired minimum number of children only to have a target number of sons 
or daughters.  By lowering or removing these targets, overall fertility should fall.  Freedman and 
Coombs (1974) criticize this prediction on the grounds that it does not allow parents to stop early 
upon reaching a particular combination of sons and daughters. 
The bliss-point model of childbearing in Section 1.3.1 more flexibly allows parents to 
also fall short of their ideal number of children.  For example, among couples following the 
strategy represented by the final column of A in Table 1.7 (r*=1, c*=2, α=1), half have two 
children but the rest have only one child, which is less than their ideal number of two total 
children.  If these couples instead did not care about the sex of children, they would all have two 
children.  Eliminating sex preferences would therefore cause half of these couples to have one 
additional child.  Similar calculations for other strategies show that, if all couples no longer cared 
about the sex of their children, some would have additional children, some fewer, and some the 
same number. 
Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 1.13 present estimated bounds on the expected change in 
overall fertility under two separate counterfactual scenarios: all couples want a balance of sons 
and daughters (r*=½), and all couples care only about their number of children (α=0).  These 
calculations are performed according to the procedure in Section 1.3.3.  For example, to calculate 
the expected change in children per couple if all couples want a balance of sons and daughters, 
each element of F is set equal to the expected change in fertility if a couple following the 
corresponding strategy retains the same ideal number of children and relative importance of the 
sex of children (c* and α) but wants half of children to be sons (r*=½).  In each scenario, the 
average number of children per couple would change by at most 0.2.  These estimates suggest 
that, although encouraging parents to have balanced or weakened sex preferences could 
substantially raise or lower fertility for many individual couples, in aggregate these changes 
would have little effect on overall fertility levels. 
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Panel (c) of Figure 1.13 presents estimated bounds on the change in children per couple if 
all couples want one less child than before (c*–1).  On all continents, fertility would fall by 
between 0.6 and 0.75 children per couple.  The magnitude of the decline is less than one because 
some couples already want zero children.  Imperfect control over conception also tempers the 
decline: parents that want fewer children spend more childbearing periods trying not to get 
pregnant, but during these periods they still run a risk of conception.  Additionally, among 
parents that care mostly or entirely about the sex of their children, a desire for one less child will 
have little effect on childbearing decisions.  However, the predicted decline of roughly two-
thirds of a child per couple is still substantial.  Together, the three panels of Figure 1.13 suggest 
that sex preferences alone do not shape overall fertility levels.  Policies aimed at reducing each 
couple’s ideal number of children would more effectively lower aggregate fertility. 
 
1.7  Conclusion 
 
Son preference is widespread in many countries in Asia.  Although parents in much of the 
rest of the world do not overwhelmingly want sons or daughters, parity progression ratios and 
sequences of sons and daughters exhibit substantial variation within regions.  In this paper, I 
introduce a new framework for measuring the heterogeneity in childbearing strategies that 
generates this variation.  The framework identifies the combinations of preferences over sex and 
number of children that best explain observed sequences of sons and daughters in completed 
families.  I estimate that at least 40 percent of parents in Africa, Asia, and the Americas make 
childbearing decisions that depend on the sex of previous children.  Substantial shares of parents 
do not want a balance of sons and daughters, and the direction of these preferences 
overwhelmingly favors sons only in Asia. 
These findings provide a richer account of the role of gender in childbearing decisions.  
Differential treatment of and opportunities for boys and girls is widespread (Arnold 1997), but 
the study of sex preferences during childbearing has focused largely on Asia and a handful of 
countries outside of Asia where parents overwhelmingly want sons or want a balance of sons and 
daughters.  The new framework in this paper reveals that, in much of the world, sex preferences 
are widespread and heterogeneous.  Some parents want sons, others daughters, and others a 
balance of sons and daughters.  By calculating bounds on sex preferences – bounds that are 
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meaningfully narrow – this paper connects the study of sex preferences with a growing literature 
on partial identification in economics, reviewed by Tamer (2010). 
Heterogeneity in sex preferences within a population implies heterogeneity in the 
underlying tastes, incentives, and constraints that shape sex preferences.  I show that variation in 
agricultural traditions in Africa is associated with whether parents tend to prefer sons or 
daughters today.  These traditions follow ethnic group boundaries that cross country borders.  
Household surveys are generally conducted at the country level, but these findings indicate that 
alternative groupings of parents can identify greater homogeneity in preferences. 
Finally, estimates using the new framework suggest that, although widespread, sex 
preferences do not shape overall fertility levels.  Sex preferences lead some couples to have more 
than their ideal number of children and others to stop childbearing early.  Although individual 
couples may substantially exceed or stop short of their ideal number of children, these effects 
balance out in aggregate, and weakening or eliminating sex preferences would only slightly 
change overall fertility levels.  Factors that reduce the number of overall children that parents 
want to have, such as lower infant mortality or improved economic opportunities for women, 
may offer more effective policy levers for reducing fertility. 
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Table 1.1: Standard Measures of Sex Preferences in Simulated Populations 
 
     Population 1 Population 2 Population 3 
  
  
 All couples 
stop after 
1st son and 
have up to 
2 children 
All couples 
stop after 
1st daughter 
and have up 
to 3 children 
60% of 
couples from 
population 1, 
40% from 
population 2 
Share of boys with a younger sibling  0.00 0.86 0.38 
Share of girls with a younger sibling 0.67 0.00 0.38 
Average number of siblings of boys 0.33 1.71 0.94 
Average number of siblings of girls 1.00 0.57 0.81 
Share of all children that are boys 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Share of last-born children that are boys 0.75 0.13 0.50 
Average share of sons per family 0.63 0.33 0.51 
Parity progression ratios    
 1st child 2nd child      
 Boy –   0 1 0.4 
 Girl –   1 0 0.6 
 Boy Boy   – 1 1 
 Boy Girl   – 0 0 
 Girl Boy   0 – 0 
 Girl Girl   0 – 0 
 
Notes:  The distribution of sequences of children in completed families is calculated assuming a likelihood of one-
half that each birth is a boy.  In population 1, one-half of parents have a first-born son and stop, one-quarter have a 
daughter and then a son, and one-quarter have two daughters.  In population 2, one-half of parents have a first-born 
daughter and stop, one-quarter have a son and then a daughter, one-eighth have three sons, and one-eighth have two 
sons and then a daughter.  In population 3, 30 percent of couples have one son, 20 percent have one daughter, 10 
percent have a son and then a daughter, 15 percent have a daughter and then a son, 15 percent have two daughters, 5 
percent have three sons, and 5 percent have two sons and then a daughter.  Among parents that start with each given 
sequence of sons and daughters, parity progression ratios measure the share that have at least one more child. 
  
31 
Table 1.2: Birth History Sources 
 
Country Sources Women 
Africa   
Angola DHS(2011) 936 
Benin DHS(1996,2001,2006,2011) WFS(1981) 8,504 
Burkina Faso DHS(1992,1998,2003,2010) 7,272 
Burundi DHS(1987,2010) 1,979 
Central African Rep. DHS(1994) 886 
Cameroon DHS(1991,1998,2004,2011) WFS(1978) 7,167 
Chad DHS(1996,2004) 2,182 
Comoros DHS(1996,2012) 1,179 
Congo DHS(2005) 979 
Congo, Dem. Rep. DHS(2007,2013) 4,504 
Cote d’Ivoire DHS(1994,1998,2011) WFS(1980) 3,975 
Egypt DHS(1988,1992,1995,2000,2003,2005,2008) WFS(1980) 27,925 
Ethiopia DHS(1992,1997,2003) 7,235 
Gabon DHS(2000,2012) 2,472 
Ghana DHS(1988,1993,1998,2003,2008) MICS(2011) WFS(1979) 7,757 
Guinea DHS(1999,2005,2012) 4,433 
Kenya DHS(1988,1993,1998,2003,2008) WFS(1977) 7,289 
Lesotho DHS(2004,2009) WFS(1977) 3,403 
Liberia DHS(1986,2006,2008,2013) 4,463 
Madagascar DHS(1992,1997,2003,2008) 6,700 
Malawi DHS(1992,2000,2004,2010) MICS(2006,2013) 14,785 
Mali DHS(1987,1995,2001,2006,2012) 8,466 
Mauritania MICS(2011) WFS(1981) 2,938 
Morocco DHS(1987,1992,2003) WFS(1980) 7,546 
Mozambique DHS(1997,2003,2011) 5,648 
Namibia DHS(1992,2000,2006,2013) 5,316 
Niger DHS(1992,1998,2006,2012) 5,353 
Nigeria DHS(1990,1999,2003,2008,2010,2013) 18,220 
Rwanda DHS(1992,2000,2005,2007,2010) 8,262 
Sao Tome & Principe DHS(2008) 506 
Senegal DHS(1986,1992,1997,2005,2008,2010,2012) WFS(1978) 12,182 
Sierra Leone DHS(2008,2013) 3,864 
Somalia MICS(2006) 849 
South Africa DHS(1998) 2,221 
South Sudan MICS(2010) 1,150 
Sudan MICS(2010) WFS(1978) 2,979 
Swaziland DHS(2006) MICS(2010) 1,602 
Tanzania DHS(1991,1996,1999,2004,2009) 6,759 
Togo DHS(1988,1998) 1,880 
Tunisia DHS(1988) MICS(2011) WFS(1978) 4,625 
Uganda DHS(1988,1995,2000,2006,2009,2011) 5,591 
Zambia DHS(1992,1996,2001,2007) 4,074 
Zimbabwe DHS(1988,1994,1999,2005,2010) MICS(2009,2014) 8,951 
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Table 1.2 (Continued): Birth History Sources 
 
Country Sources Women 
Asia   
Armenia DHS(2000,2005,2010) 5,430 
Azerbaijan DHS(2006) 2,327 
Bangladesh DHS(1993,1996,1999,2004,2007,2011) WFS(1975) 14,665 
Cambodia DHS(2000,2005,2010) 11,301 
China CFS(1988) 155,474 
India DHS(1992,1998,2005) REDS(1982) 62,591 
Indonesia DHS(1987,1991,1994,1997,2002,2007) WFS(1976) 42,878 
Iraq MICS(2006,2011) 13,301 
Japan JGSS(2000,2001,2002,2005,2006,2008,2010) 9,522 
Jordan DHS(1990,1997,2002,2007,2009,2012) 13,732 
Kazakhstan DHS(1995,1999) 2,088 
Korea WFS(1974) 1,544 
Kyrgyzstan DHS(1997,2012) 2,559 
Laos MICS(2011) 4,622 
Malaysia WFS(1974) 1,756 
Maldives DHS(2009) 1,740 
Nepal DHS(1996,2001,2006,2011) MICS(2014) WFS(1976) 11,841 
Pakistan DHS(1990,2006,2012) WFS(1975) 8,547 
Philippines DHS(1993,1998,2003,2008,2013) WFS(1978) 17,646 
Sri Lanka WFS(1975) 1,911 
Syria WFS(1978) 1,072 
Tajikistan DHS(2012) 1,932 
Thailand DHS(1987) 1,651 
Timor-Leste DHS(2009) 2,494 
Turkey DHS(1993,1998,2003) WFS(1978) 6,597 
Uzbekistan DHS(1996) 761 
Vietnam DHS(1997,2002) 3,384 
Yemen DHS(1991) MICS(2006) WFS(1979) 2,764 
Europe   
Albania DHS(2008) 2,300 
Moldova DHS(2005) MICS(2012) 3,742 
Ukraine DHS(2007) 2,028 
North America   
Costa Rica WFS(1976) 874 
Dominican Rep. DHS(1986,1991,1996,1999,2002,2007,2013) WFS(1975) 16,886 
Guatemala DHS(1987,1995,1998) 3,830 
Haiti DHS(1994,2000,2005,2012) WFS(1977) 7,665 
Honduras DHS(2005,2011) 7,503 
Jamaica WFS(1975) 666 
Mexico DHS(1987) WFS(1976) 2,989 
Nicaragua DHS(1997,2001) 4,437 
Panama WFS(1975) 769 
Trinidad & Tobago DHS(1987) WFS(1977) 1,420 
United States IFSS(1970,1973,1976,1982,1988,1995,2002) 9,280 
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Table 1.2 (Continued): Birth History Sources 
 
Country Sources Women 
Oceania   
Fiji WFS(1974) 1,056 
South America   
Bolivia DHS(1989,1993,1998,2003,2008) 11,780 
Brazil DHS(1986,1991,1996) 4,394 
Colombia DHS(1986,1990,1995,2000,2004,2009) WFS(1976) 28,337 
Ecuador DHS(1987) WFS(1979) 1,753 
Guyana DHS(2009) WFS(1975) 2,007 
Paraguay DHS(1990) WFS(1979) 1,814 
Peru DHS(1986,1991,1996,2000,2003,2009,2010,2011,2012) WFS(1977) 46,803 
Venezuela WFS(1977) 358 
 
Sources: China Fertility Survey (CFS; a 10 percent sample of the 1988 “Two-per-thousand” survey), Demographic 
and Health Survey (DHS; MeasureDHS 1985–2015), India Rural Economic and Demographic Survey (REDS; 
National Council of Applied Economic Research 1982), Japanese General Social Survey (JGSS; Institute of 
Regional Studies at Osaka University of Commerce 2000–2010), United States Integrated Fertility Survey Series 
(IFSS; Smock, Granda, and Hoelter 1955–2002), Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS; UNICEF 2006–2014), 
and World Fertility Survey (WFS; International Statistics Institute 1974–1981).  Only surveys that meet the 
following conditions are included: surveys that have national coverage; surveys that collect complete birth histories; 
surveys in which less than 1 percent of women report a total number of children that differs from that given in their 
birth history; and surveys in which less than 1 percent of women report births out of order.  The sample excludes 
birth histories that do not report the order and sex of each of a woman’s children.  The final column provides the 
number of women aged 40 and above observed in each country.  The Japanese General Social Surveys (JGSS) are 
designed and carried out at the Institute of Regional Studies at Osaka University of Commerce in collaboration with 
the Institute of Social Science at the University of Tokyo under the direction of Ichiro Tanioka, Michio Nitta, Hiroki 
Sato and Noriko Iwai with Project Manager, Minae Osawa.  The project is financially assisted by Gakujutsu Frontier 
Grant from the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology for 1999–2003 academic 
years, and the datasets are compiled with cooperation from the SSJ Data Archive, Information Center for Social 
Science Research on Japan, Institute of Social Science, and the University of Tokyo. 
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Table 1.3: Parity Progression Ratios in Observed Populations 
 
1st 
child 
2nd 
child 
3rd 
child  Africa Asia 
North 
America 
South 
America 
Boy – –  0.963 0.955 0.930 0.922 
Girl – –  0.962 0.958 0.928 0.917 
Boy Boy –  0.940 0.857 0.867 0.828 
Boy Girl –  0.933 0.853 0.845 0.798 
Girl Boy –  0.935 0.852 0.838 0.809 
Girl Girl –  0.942 0.904 0.852 0.833 
Boy Boy Boy  0.909 0.788 0.795 0.758 
Boy Boy Girl  0.896 0.759 0.757 0.735 
Boy Girl Boy  0.897 0.760 0.777 0.744 
Boy Girl Girl  0.907 0.812 0.779 0.747 
Girl Boy Boy  0.900 0.761 0.777 0.754 
Girl Boy Girl  0.905 0.813 0.771 0.746 
Girl Girl Boy  0.904 0.784 0.772 0.746 
Girl Girl Girl  0.916 0.871 0.785 0.771 
 
Notes: Among parents age 40 and above that start with each given sequence of sons and daughters, parity 
progression ratios measure the share that have at least one more child.  Source: See Table 1.2. 
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Table 1.4: Binomial Test of Equal Parity Progression Ratios in Asia 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1st 
child 
2nd 
child 
3rd 
child 
 
Number of 
respondents 
that reach 
given sequence 
Number of 
respondents 
that progress 
beyond given 
sequence 
Parity 
progression 
ratio 
Parity 
progression 
ratio if even 
across parity 
Binomial test 
p-value: 
n=(1) 
k=(2) 
p=(4) 
Minimum 
p-value, 
by parity 
Boy – –  204,015 194,873 0.955 
0.957 
      <0.001 
<0.001 
Girl – –  186,781 178,991 0.958       <0.001 
          
Boy Boy –  100,518 86,129 0.857 
0.865 
 
      <0.001 
<0.001 
Boy Girl –  94,355 80,446 0.853       <0.001 
Girl Boy –  92,153 78,516 0.852       <0.001 
Girl Girl –  86,838 78,459 0.904       <0.001 
          
Boy Boy Boy  44,341 34,953 0.788 
0.792 
 
0.015 
<0.001 
Boy Boy Girl  41,788 31,728 0.759       <0.001 
Boy Girl Boy  41,324 31,414 0.760       <0.001 
Boy Girl Girl  39,122 31,748 0.812       <0.001 
Girl Boy Boy  40,607 30,902 0.761       <0.001 
Girl Boy Girl  37,909 30,834 0.813       <0.001 
Girl Girl Boy  40,617 31,859 0.784       <0.001 
Girl Girl Girl  37,842 32,967 0.871       <0.001 
 
Notes:  This table demonstrates how the binomial tests in Section 1.2 are calculated.  The compiled dataset described 
in Table 1.2 contains 406,130 women aged 40 and above living in Asia that provide birth histories.  Each row of this 
table represents a unique sequence of sons and daughters.  Column 1 provides the number of women that reach each 
given sequence, column 2 the number that progress beyond each sequence, and column 3 the corresponding parity 
progression ratio.  Column 4 presents the parity progression ratio if all women with the same number of total 
children had been equally likely to have another child.  For example, of the 390,796 women that have one child, 
373,864, or 95.7 percent, have a second child.  Column 5 presents the one-tailed p-values from a binomial test in 
which the number of trials is given by column 1, the number of successes is given by column 2, and the assumed 
true probability of success is given by column 4.  For example, if the 204,015 women that have a boy all have 
another child with likelihood 0.957, 195,176 would be expected to have a second child and the likelihood is less 
than 0.001 that 194,873 or fewer will in fact have a second child.  Column 6 identifies the smallest p-value by parity.  
For all parities, these smallest p-values are less than 0.001, suggesting that sampling error alone cannot account for 
the variation in parity progression ratios in Asia. 
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Table 1.5: Correspondence between Stopping Rules and Bliss-point Utility Model 
 
   
Son 
preference 
Daughter 
preference 
Balance 
preference 
No 
preference 
   Stopping rule     
   Min. children: 1 1 1 2 
   Max. children: 2 2 3 2 
   Stop after: 
1st 
son 
1st 
daughter 
1 son and 
1 daughter 
 
   Bliss-point preferences     
   Childbearing periods, T 2 2 3 2 
   
Ideal share of children 
that are boys, 𝑟∗: 
1 0 0.5 0 
   
Ideal number of 
children, 𝑐∗: 
2 2 2 2 
Observed sequence of children Relative importance of 1 1 1 0 
1st child 2nd child 3rd child The sex of children, α:     
Boy – –  ½    
Girl – –   ½   
Boy Boy –   ¼  ¼ 
Boy Girl –   ¼ ¼ ¼ 
Girl Boy –  ¼  ¼ ¼ 
Girl Girl –  ¼   ¼ 
Boy Boy Boy    ⅛  
Boy Boy Girl    ⅛  
Boy Girl Boy      
Boy Girl Girl      
Girl Boy Boy      
Girl Boy Girl      
Girl Girl Boy    ⅛  
Girl Girl Girl    ⅛  
 
Notes:  This table demonstrates that the bliss-point utility model introduced in Section 1.3.1 explains several 
standard stopping rules.  Each column reports a childbearing strategy, and each row presents the likelihood that a 
parent following that strategy has the indicated sequence of children under the assumption that each child is a son 
with likelihood one-half and parents have perfect control over conception.  For example, a couple following the son-
preferential stopping rule in column 1 has a son with likelihood one-half, a daughter and then a son with likelihood 
one-quarter, and two daughters with likelihood one-quarter.  A couple following the bliss-point preferences strategy 
in column 1 has the same expected distribution over possible sequences of children.  For columns 1, 2, and 4, two 
childbearing periods are assumed.  For column 3, three childbearing periods are assumed. 
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Table 1.6: Collapse of Childbearing into Sequence of Sons and Daughters 
 
(a) Original  (b) Collapsed by sequence of sons and daughters 
Period #1 Period #2 Likelihood  Child #1 Child #2 Likelihood 
No child No child 0  – – 0 
No child Son (1–q)l 
 Son – (1–q)l + ql(1–q) 
Son No child ql(1–q) 
No child Daughter (1–q)(1–l) 
 Daughter – (1–q)(1–l) + q(1–l)(1–q) 
Daughter No child q(1–l)(1–q) 
Son Son qlql  Son Son qlql 
Son Daughter qlq(1–l)  Son Daughter qlq(1–l) 
Daughter Son q(1–l)ql  Daughter Son q(1–l)ql 
Daughter Daughter q(1–l)q(1–l)  Daughter Daughter q(1–l)q(1–l) 
 
Notes:  Panel (a) presents the likelihood that a couple has each possible sequence of childbearing periods with no 
child, a son, and a daughter, given that the couple wants one child regardless of its sex (α=0, c*=1, r* does not 
matter), has perfect control over conception when trying to get pregnant (p=1), and can accidentally conceive when 
not trying to get pregnant (0<q<1).  Each child is a boy with likelihood l.  The couple’s childbearing decisions are 
governed by equation 1 and discussed in Section 1.3.2.  The couple does not try to get pregnant in the first period, 
and then only tries to get pregnant in the second period if the first period did not yield a child.  Panel (b) collapses 
these likelihoods by each unique sequence of sons and daughters, ignoring the timing of each birth.  Empirical 
estimates in Sections 1.4 through 1.6 use these collapsed sequences. 
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Table 1.7: Structure of Matrices Used in Section 1.3 
 
  Share in 
population  
Likelihood of each sequence of children 
given each combination of preferences 
 
   Ideal share of children that are boys, r*: 0.0 0.0 ∙∙∙ 0.5 ∙∙∙ 1.0 1.0  
1st 2nd  Ideal number of children, c*: 0 0 ∙∙∙ 1 ∙∙∙ 2 2  
child child  Relative importance of the sex of children, α: 0.0 0.1 ∙∙∙ 0.5 ∙∙∙ 0.9 1.0  
– – 0  1 1 ∙∙∙ 0 ∙∙∙ 0 0  
Boy – ½  0 0 ∙∙∙ ½ ∙∙∙ ½ ½  
Girl – 0  0 0 ∙∙∙ ½ ∙∙∙ 0 0  
Boy Boy 0  0 0 ∙∙∙ 0 ∙∙∙ 0 0  
Boy Girl 0  0 0 ∙∙∙ 0 ∙∙∙ 0 0  
Girl Boy ¼  0 0 ∙∙∙ 0 ∙∙∙ ¼ ¼  
Girl Girl ¼ D 0 0 ∙∙∙ 0 ∙∙∙ ¼ ¼ A 
 
Notes:  See Section 1.3.3. 
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Figure 1.1: Countries Represented in the Final Dataset 
 
 
 
Source:  See Table 1.2. 
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Figure 1.2: Countries in Which Parity Progression Ratios Indicate Sex Preferences 
 
(a) Parity progression among couples with one child 
 
 
(b) Parity progression among couples with two children 
 
 
(c) Parity progression among couples with three children 
 
 
Notes:  Using survey data described in Table 1.2, this map indicates countries for which the minimum p-value from 
the binomial test described in Table 1.2 is less than 0.05.  For these countries, highlighted in dark blue, sampling 
error alone cannot explain observed variation in parity progression ratios, suggesting that the sex of previous 
children influences whether parents have another child.  For countries highlighted in gray, sampling error alone 
could explain observed variation and sex preferences are not discernible.  Panels (a), (b), and (c) perform this test for 
parity progression ratios among parents that have one child, two children, and three children. 
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Figure 1.3: Combinations of Preferences that Exactly Match Simulated Population 1 
 
              
 
 
 
Notes:  This figure presents preferences that best explain simulated population 1 in Table 1.1, calculated assuming 
two childbearing periods, an even chance that each child is a son, and perfect control over conception.  The dots in 
panels (b) through (f) each represent a population in which all parents have the same preferences.  In each of these 
populations, the expected distribution of sequences of children exactly matches the observed population.  For 
example, the final strategy listed in A in Table 1.7 (r*=1, c*=2, α=1) exactly matches the observed population and is 
given by the dot in the upper-right corner of panel (f).  Each vertex of the three-dimensional object in panel (g) 
corresponds to a dot in panels (b) through (f) and is a unique combination of preferences that, in expectation, exactly 
matches the observed population.  Because any population that consists of combinations of couples following any of 
these unique strategies also exactly matches the observed population, the polyhedron in panel (g) is a convex set of 
all possible combinations of average values of r*, c*, and α that exactly match the observed population.  Each of the 
polygons in panels (c) through (f) provide slices of the polyhedron in panel (g), holding average r* constant. 
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Figure 1.4: Estimated Bounds on Average Values of Preferences in Simulated Populations 
 
 
 
Notes:  Populations defined in Table 1.1.  The rectangles provide estimated bounds on the average value of 
preferences that best explain the observed populations, calculated according to the procedure given in Section 1.3, 
assuming three childbearing periods, a one-half chance that each birth is a boy, and perfect control over conception.  
For example, in population 1, the average ideal share of children that are boys could be anywhere between 0.6 and 1. 
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Figure 1.5: Estimated Bounds on Average Values of Preferences, by Continent 
 
 
 
Notes:  The dark rectangles provide bounds on average values of preferences, calculated according Section 1.3 with 
parameter values given in Section 1.4.  The light rectangles provide 95-percent confidence intervals around the 
unknown true value, calculated from 1,000 subsamples drawn according to Romano and Shaikh (2008).  
Coefficients of determination (CD) calculated according to McKean and Sievers (1987).  For example, in Africa the 
average ideal share of children that are boys is between 0.25 and 0.9.  Sample defined in Table 1.2, restricted to 
women that gave birth eight or fewer times and do not have any twin births. 
  
44 
Figure 1.6: Robustness of Estimates in Africa to Choice of Model Parameters 
 
Notes:  This figure compares the estimated bounds on average values of preferences in Africa (solid rectangles) with 
estimated bounds under alternative assumptions (hollow rectangles).  Calculations are performed according to 
Section 1.3, with the main specification given in Section 1.4.  Coefficients of determination (CD) calculated 
according to McKean and Sievers (1987).  The first set of comparisons varies the number of childbearing periods, T, 
which is also the maximum number of children permitted in the sample.  The second set of comparisons varies the 
likelihood that each birth is a boy, l.  The final set of comparisons varies the increment between every possible ideal 
share of children that are sons, r*, and between every possible relative importance of the sex of children, α.  Sample 
defined as in Figure 1.5. 
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Figure 1.7: Robustness of Estimates in Africa to Assumed Control over Conception 
 
Notes:  This figure compares the estimated bounds on average values of preferences in Africa (solid rectangles) with 
estimated bounds under alternative assumptions (hollow rectangles).  Calculations are performed according to 
Section 1.3, with the main specification given in Section 1.4.  Coefficients of determination (CD) calculated 
according to McKean and Sievers (1987).  p is the assumed likelihood of conception when trying to get pregnant, 
and q is the assumed likelihood of conception when not trying to get pregnant.  Sample defined as in Figure 1.5. 
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Figure 1.8: Robustness of Estimates in Africa to Changes in Sample Definition 
 
Notes:  This figure compares the estimated bounds on average values of preferences in Africa (solid rectangles) with 
estimated bounds under alternative assumptions (hollow rectangles).  Calculations are performed according to 
Section 1.3, with the main specification given in Section 1.4.  Coefficients of determination (CD) calculated 
according to McKean and Sievers (1987).  The first set of comparisons varies the minimum age at observation for 
which women are included in the sample.  The second set varies the marriage status of women whose birth histories 
are included in the analysis sample.  The final set varies how deceased children are included in the analysis sample.  
Sample defined as in Figure 1.5. 
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Figure 1.9: Additional Summary Measures of Sex Preferences 
 
 
 
Notes:  The dark rectangles provide bounds on summary measures of preferences, defined in Section 1.4.3 and 
calculated according to Section 1.3.  The light rectangles provide 95-percent confidence intervals around the 
unknown true value, calculated from 1,000 subsamples drawn according to Romano and Shaikh (2008).  
Coefficients of determination (CD) calculated according to McKean and Sievers (1987).  For example, in Africa the 
share of parents that make childbearing decisions that depend on the sex of previous children is between 0.4 and 
0.95.  Sample defined as in Figure 1.5. 
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Figure 1.10: Comparison between Estimated and Reported Preferences 
 
 
 
Notes:  The hollow rectangles provide bounds on summary measures of preferences, defined in Sections 1.4.3 and 
1.4.4 and calculated according to Section 1.3.  The solid circles provide average reported values of these summary 
measures, as recorded in Demographic and Health Surveys.  The surveys ask women to report the number of total 
children, sons, and daughters they wanted at the start of their childbearing career.  Coefficients of determination 
(CD) calculated according to McKean and Sievers (1987).  For example, 60 percent of parents in Africa report 
wanting a balance of sons and daughters, while estimated values of this share are between 2 and 52 percent.  Sample 
defined as in Figure 1.5, restricted to include only women who report wanting eight or fewer children and whose 
total number of desired children equals the sum of their desired number of sons and desired number of daughters. 
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Figure 1.11: Respondent Locations by Agricultural Traditions in Africa 
 
 
 
Notes:  This figure provides the location of birth history survey respondents in Africa according to traditional 
agricultural practices.  Ethnic group characteristics are taken from George Murdock’s Ethnographic Atlas (1967).  
Not all characteristics are recorded for all ethnic groups.  Of the 533 ethnic groups in Africa, inheritance of land 
traditionally follows the patrilineal line in 307 groups, the matrilineal line in 67 groups, neither in 32 groups, and is 
not recorded in 127 groups.  Agriculture is traditionally primarily performed by men in 76 groups, by women in 146 
groups, my men and women equally in 102 groups, and is not recorded in 209 groups.  The plow was historically 
used in agriculture in 32 groups, was not used in 455 groups, and was not recorded in 46 groups.  Ethnic group 
boundaries follow Murdock’s Tribal Map of Africa (1959).  Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) generously make 
available an electronic shapefile of the Tribal Map, and Fenske (2009) generously provides a crosswalk between the 
Tribal Map and Ethnographic Atlas.  Birth histories are drawn from all Demographic and Health Surveys that record 
respondent latitude and longitude.  These locations are recorded with up to five kilometers of imprecision, so I 
exclude respondents that live within five kilometers of an ethnic group boundary. 
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Figure 1.12: Direction of Sex Preferences by Agricultural Tradition in Africa 
 
 
Notes:  The dark rectangles provide bounds on the direction of sex preferences, defined in Section 1.5 and calculated 
according to Section 1.3.  The light rectangles provide 95-percent confidence intervals around the unknown true 
value, calculated from 1,000 subsamples drawn according to Romano and Shaikh (2008).  Coefficients of 
determination (CD) calculated according to McKean and Sievers (1987).  Estimates are calculated according to 
traditional agricultural practices as given in Figure 1.11.  For example, in areas where the plow was traditionally 
used in agriculture, the identified set for the direction of preferences is mostly positive, suggesting son preference.  
Sample defined as in Figure 1.11. 
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Figure 1.13: Estimated Change in Children per Couple as Preferences Change 
 
 
 
Notes:  The dark rectangles provide bounds on the estimated change in overall fertility levels as preferences change, 
defined in Section 1.6 and calculated according to Section 1.3.  The light rectangles provide 95-percent confidence 
intervals around the unknown true value, calculated from 1,000 subsamples drawn according to Romano and Shaikh 
(2008).  Coefficients of determination (CD) calculated according to McKean and Sievers (1987).  For example, if all 
parents in the sample in Africa desired half of their children to be boys, overall fertility would rise by at most 0.05 
children per woman.  Sample defined as in Figure 1.5. 
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CHAPTER II
 
Family Planning and Fertility in South Africa under Apartheid 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
In 1950, the total fertility rate stood at more than six children per woman in both South 
Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole.  By 1990, fertility had nearly halved in South Africa 
but barely changed across Sub-Saharan Africa (United Nations 2014a).  During this interval, the 
national government in South Africa expanded its provision of family planning services by 
establishing thousands of stationary and mobile clinics, sending family planning advisors door-
to-door, and offering free contraception.  Government expenditure on family planning rose from 
a tiny amount in the 1950s to comprise roughly one-quarter of all government spending on health 
in the late 1980s (Republic of South Africa 1950–1989). 
Brown (1987), De Vos (1988), and Kaufman (1996, 2000) argue that the coincidence of 
rising public provision of family planning services and falling fertility suggests that these 
services contributed to South Africa’s fertility decline.  However, as shown in Figure 2.1, the 
fertility decline was underway by the 1950s, well before government spending on family 
planning started to surge in the 1970s.  The time series of family planning expenditure and 
fertility rates over the last half of the twentieth century alone are not sufficient to establish 
whether public provision of family planning contributed to South Africa’s fertility decline.  In 
this paper, I develop a new approach that additionally uses spatial variation in the availability of 
family planning services.  This variation directly resulted from the political ideology governing 
South Africa at the time. 
From 1948 until 1994, South Africa was governed by a system of apartheid.  Apartheid 
was political, economic, and residential separation on the basis of race.  White South Africans 
controlled the national government and major economic institutions.  All other South Africans – 
formally, African, coloured, or Asian – could not vote and faced restrictions on their mobility 
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and employment.  This separation was particularly acute for Africans, who comprised roughly 
three-quarters of the population.  Every African was officially a citizen of one of ten 
“homelands.”  These generally poor, rural homelands covered 13 percent of the land area of 
South Africa, and by 1960 every African was required to reside in a homeland unless he or she 
had permission to live and work in the more prosperous “white areas.”  Roughly half of Africans 
lived in homelands, the rest in urban townships and white-owned farms in white areas.  
Apartheid therefore generated separation not just between whites and non-whites but also 
between Africans living in white areas and Africans living in homelands. 
This separation extended to access to family planning services.  White South Africans 
consistently exhibited the lowest birth rates of the four racial groups and, by the early 1960s, 
national government officials cited a dwindling white minority as cause for alarm (Brown 1987, 
Chimere-Dan 1993, Kaufman 1996, Mostert et al. 1998).  In response, the government 
encouraged immigration from Europe, urged white families to have additional children, and 
expanded direct provision of family planning services (Smith 1976, Brown 1987).  Because 
many white residents but few non-white residents already enjoyed access to family planning 
services through private physicians, this expansion most substantially increased access to family 
planning services for non-white residents.  However, the national government delegated control 
over homeland health services to homeland governments (Department of Health 1973).  These 
governments largely declined to provide family planning services, in part due to the overtly 
political motive behind the national government’s provision of family planning services 
(President’s Council 1983, de Beer 1984).  As a result, African residents of white areas generally 
enjoyed easier access to family planning services than did African residents of the homelands. 
Using a new compilation of demographic surveys conducted since the 1970s, I measure 
use of family planning services and childbearing patterns over time separately for African 
women in white areas and African women in homelands.  I show that African women living in 
white areas were consistently more likely to use contraception and be visited by family planning 
advisors than were African women living in homelands.  I also show that fertility rates among 
African women declined sharply in white areas relative to homelands in the early 1970s as the 
national government began to directly provide family planning services.  Deferral of 
childbearing contributed to this fertility decline: African women in white areas first gave birth 
later in life, had longer intervals between births, and stopped giving birth later in life.  Among 
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cohorts of African women who entered their main childbearing years after 1970, lifetime fertility 
fell by one child per woman in white areas relative to homelands. 
Imperfect recordkeeping during the apartheid era prevents a complete accounting of the 
many factors that may have contributed to South Africa’s fertility decline.  Particularly in the 
homelands, wage rates and other employment information is largely unknown, and incomplete 
coverage in many censuses makes even precise population counts difficult to establish.  
However, the particular timing of the decline in African fertility in white areas in the early 1970s 
strongly suggests that the corresponding surge in government provision of family planning 
services in these areas helped women have fewer children.  The national government achieved its 
immediate objective of slowing population growth.  But, to the extent that this slowdown in 
African population growth helped the apartheid government stay in power, the effect did not last 
long: apartheid ended barely a generation after the government first provided family planning 
services. 
 
2.2  Government Provision of Family Planning Services in South Africa 
 
Since at least the start of the twentieth century, private physicians in South Africa 
supplied contraception to white patients.  Dedicated family planning clinics first opened in Cape 
Town in 1932, and local family planning associations founded clinics in other major cities over 
the subsequent decades.  Family planning services during the first half of the twentieth century 
were generally restricted to white residents (aside from a single clinic in Cape Town) and 
received little government funding (Caldwell 1992, Caldwell and Caldwell 1993, Klausen 2004). 
By the early 1960s, a National Family Planning Association operated several dozen urban 
clinics that offered family planning services to members of all racial groups.  In 1963, the 
national government first provided a small grant to the National Family Planning Association.  
These grants rose steadily throughout the rest of the decade and, in 1970, the government fully 
funded and began to assume control of the Association’s clinics (Caldwell 1992, Caldwell and 
Caldwell 1993).  In 1974, having taken control of all of the clinics, the government announced a 
National Family Planning Program (Bernstein 1985, Brown 1987).  Stand-alone clinics, mobile 
clinics, and door-to-door recruiters offered free contraception and family planning counseling 
(Department of Health 1976).  By the end of the 1980s, there were thousands of stationary clinics 
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and tens of thousands of mobile service delivery points (Department of Health 1987).  This 
increase in the public provision of family planning services came amidst a wave of similar 
programs in other countries, and the distribution of services was shaped by the political 
environment in South Africa. 
 
2.2.1  Family Planning in International Context 
 
During a period of particularly rapid population growth during the middle of the 
twentieth century, Malthusian concerns about famine and large populations outstripping scarce 
resources motivated publications, such as Paul Ehrlich’s The Population Bomb, and a series of 
United Nations conferences on population (Ehrlich 1968, Finkle and Crane 1975, Lam 2011, 
United Nations 2014b).  In response, many countries relaxed restrictions on the distribution of 
contraception, increased subsidies to encourage their use, or expanded public provision of family 
planning services (Finlay et al. 2012).  South Africa was one of these countries.  As early as 
1955, a government commission proposed a planned parenthood campaign as a solution to “the 
population problem in South Africa” (Union of South Africa 1955, page 25).  Little more than a 
decade later, one projection held that, if left unchecked, South Africa’s population would rise 
from 21 million in 1970 to 700 million within a century.  In response, Connie Mulder, South 
Africa’s Minister of Information, advocated for family planning as a way to prevent “such an 
unrealistic growth to eventuate – a growth which must inevitably lead to poverty, under-
nourishment, bankruptcy and ruin in South Africa” (Van Rensburg 1972, page viii).  Other 
officials expressed similar concerns, and government expenditure on family planning services 
climbed steadily throughout the 1970s and 1980s. 
Developments in birth control technology facilitated expanded public provision of family 
planning services.  Through the early twentieth century, available forms of artificial birth control 
(as opposed to withdrawal, rhythm, and other natural methods) largely consisted of barrier 
methods that often suffered from high failure rates and, in the case of condoms, required that 
men cooperate with their use (Potts and Tsang 2002).  The development of more reliable oral and 
injectable contraceptives in the 1950s and 1960s allowed women greater control over 
conception, and these forms of birth control became central to public family planning campaigns 
aimed at women in many countries.  The government of South Africa heavily promoted the 
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injectable contraceptive Depo Provera, oral contraceptives, and intrauterine devices, and these 
became the most commonly used forms of contraception among African residents (Kaufman 
1996).  Because Depo Provera was administered on a three-month schedule, mobile family 
planning vans were able to travel on regular routes through rural areas, increasing the reach of 
the family planning program beyond residents that lived near stationary clinics in cities.  
Condoms gained popularity alongside widespread public awareness of HIV in the 1990s, but 
HIV was not yet a primary focus of public contraception campaigns in South Africa during most 
of the apartheid era. 
There is little evidence that the apartheid government forced residents to involuntarily 
avert births (Brown 1987).  Sterilization and abortion – two forms of birth control that have been 
used coercively in China, India, Sweden, and elsewhere (Vicziany 1982, Hyatt 1997, Ebenstein 
2010, Zampas and Lamačková 2011) – were relatively rare in South Africa.  By the late 1980s, 
less than five percent of African residents had been sterilized, while white residents were more 
than twice as likely to have been sterilized (Kaufman 1997).  Except in strict circumstances, 
abortion remained illegal in South Africa until 1996 (Klugman 1993, Cooper et al. 2004). 
 
2.2.2  Family Planning in Domestic Political Context 
 
Starting in the mid-nineteenth century, a series of white-controlled governments 
progressively partitioned South Africa into white areas and African areas (Bundy 1979).  In 
1913, the government of what was then the Union of South Africa formally set aside nine 
percent of the land for the country’s African residents (Horrell 1969).  Over the following five 
decades, white-controlled governments established pass laws mandating that African men, and 
later women, demonstrate proof of employment in order to remain in white areas of the country 
(these pass laws were repealed in 1986; Platsky and Walker 1985, Savage 1986, Phillips 1997, 
Beinart 2001).  During the apartheid era, the government forcibly removed more than 3.5 million 
African residents from white areas (Platzky and Walker 1985).  Starting in the 1960s, the 
apartheid government consolidated and enlarged the reserves to cover thirteen percent of the 
country’s land area (see Figure 2.2) and began to consider them ethnic “homelands” (or “black 
states” or “Bantustans”) that would eventually become independent countries.  In the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, the government conferred nominal independence, which no other country 
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recognized, on four of the homelands (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and Ciskei); the other 
six (Gazankulu, KaNgwane, KwaNdebele, KwaZulu, Lebowa, Qwaqwa) remained “self-
governing” (Posel 1991, Beinart 2001).  Upon the end of apartheid, all homelands were 
reintegrated into a unified South Africa. 
Maintenance of white political control motivated both the partitioning of South Africa 
and the provision of family planning services to non-white residents of white areas.  Soon after 
the formal start of apartheid in 1948, government officials worried that the growing non-white 
share of the population would imperil the white minority’s political power.  While speaking 
before Parliament in 1962, Prime Minister H. F. Verwoerd asserted that, “If the one multiracial 
state were to become a federally constituted state or a unitary state (on the basis of the Liberal 
Party's proposition of ‘one man, one vote’) and at the same time be truly democratic and in 
harmony with the spirit of the times, it would inexorably lead to Bantu domination” (Chimere-
Dan 1993, page 32).  Other government officials expressed concern about social instability in the 
face of rising numbers of underemployed African residents (Brown 1987).  In response, the 
government encouraged immigration from Europe, urged white families to have additional 
children, and extended access to family planning services to previously underserved non-white 
residents (Brown 1987, Caldwell and Caldwell 1993).  Although particularly overt, the 
politicization of family planning was not unique to South Africa.  Many governments have 
targeted family planning to particular groups, including rural residents in Mexico, members of 
lower castes in India, and poor residents in the United States (Vicziany 1982, Browner 1986, 
Potter 1999, Bailey et al. 2014). 
African leaders generally advocated against family planning.  Ferreira (1984, page 7) 
states that, “For a large number of Blacks, family planning and the political apparatus of the 
White government are still perceived as indivisible with the result that the motives of the 
[National Family Planning Program] remain suspect.”  The African Communist newspaper 
summarized the skepticism: “The so-called national family planning program is being used to 
perpetuate White domination and the oppression and exploitation of the Black majority” 
(Unsigned 1982, page 87).  Concerns about cancer-causing effects of Depo Provera further 
generated suspicion.  Several countries, including the United States and Zimbabwe, restricted the 
sale of Depo Provera, but the South African government consistently offered it at family 
planning clinics (Kaler 1998).  As nominally independent or self-governing territories, the 
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homelands assumed full financial and administrative responsibilities for their health services and 
declined to establish extensive family planning programs (Department of Health 1973, Mostert et 
al. 1988).  As depicted in Figure 2.3, per-capita expenditure on family planning in homelands 
never exceeded 7 percent of that in white areas. 
 
2.3  Empirical Strategy 
 
Through the 1960s, contraception was available to African women in South Africa at 
only a few clinics in major cities.  Given the legal restrictions on African residents’ mobility, 
many African women did not have access to these clinics.  Starting in the early 1970s, the 
national government opened additional clinics in urban areas, sent mobile clinics to rural areas, 
and offered contraception for free at these clinics.  The government therefore increased the 
number of family planning clinics, reduced the sticker price of contraception by offering it for 
free, and reduced transportation costs that African women faced in obtaining contraception.  
Although there are no records of the quantity of contraceptives distributed, the jump in the 
number of clinics from a few dozen in the 1960s to thousands in the 1980s suggests a substantial 
increase in the supply of contraception. 
Public provision of family planning services may have also changed demand for 
contraception.  By sending family planning advisors door-to-door, the government tried to 
increase information about and demand for contraception.  However, concerns about the 
program’s political objectives could have had the reverse effect and dampened demand among 
African residents.  If demand remained price-inelastic or even declined, it is possible that the 
large increase in supply translated into little additional use of contraception and had little effect 
on fertility.  In the remainder of this paper, I evaluate whether greater use of family planning 
services and lower fertility rates accompanied the government’s family planning program. 
 
2.3.1  Identification Strategy 
 
Branson and Byker (2015) use the precise location of family planning clinics that 
targeted youth during the post-apartheid era to show that women who grew up near clinics were 
less likely to give birth as a teenager.  A similar strategy would be ideally suited for evaluating 
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whether proximity to a family planning clinic allowed African women to have fewer children 
during the apartheid era.  Unfortunately, I am unable to find information about the precise 
location of family planning clinics during this period.  Annual government expenditure and 
health reports offer the most complete surviving documentation.  These reports record annual 
expenditure on family planning services in white areas and most homelands, and in some years 
record the total number of clinics in white areas.  It is these reports that indicate a surge in family 
planning expenditure in the 1970s in white areas (depicted in Figure 2.1) and a relative lack of 
funding in the homelands (depicted in Figure 2.3). 
The empirical strategy in this paper uses the fact that expansion of family planning 
services followed the partitioning of South Africa into white areas and homelands.  Family 
planning clinics and advisors served African residents of townships and white-owned farms, 
while African residents of homelands generally lived further away from these services.  This 
distinction was not absolute – some residents that lived near the edges of homelands could travel 
to white areas to obtain services (Kaufman 1997) – but the greater concentration of services in 
white areas suggests that any resulting increase in the use of contraception and decline in fertility 
should have been greater in white areas.  I separately group together all residents of white areas 
and all residents of homelands, and I compare differences in use of contraception and fertility 
over time between these two groups.  Because only Africans lived in homelands, I similarly 
consider only African residents of white areas. 
I employ a difference-in-differences empirical strategy to compare fertility rates in white 
areas and homelands before and after the government began directly providing family planning 
services in 1970.  I show that fertility rates were similar in white areas and homelands in the 
1960s.  After 1970, there was a sharp drop in fertility in white areas, the timing of which 
coincides with the large surge in government provision of family planning services.  However, to 
causally attribute the decline in fertility to the family planning program, a parallel trends 
assumption must be satisfied: absent family planning, any difference in fertility rates between 
African women living in white areas and African women living in homelands before 1970 would 
have continued after 1970. 
There are other factors that may have contributed to a decline in fertility in white areas 
over time.  African residents of white areas were by regulation employed and African women 
living in white areas, many of whom were employed as domestic workers and could have lost 
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their jobs upon becoming pregnant, had strong incentive to postpone childbearing (Caldwell and 
Caldwell 1993).  In the densely populated homelands, jobs were more scarce, incomes generally 
lower, and unemployment rates higher (Wilson and Ramphele 1989), suggesting a lower 
opportunity cost to giving birth.  Additionally, due to labor migration of African men from 
homelands into white areas, there were 55 adult men for every 100 adult women in the 
homelands at the end of the 1950s.  This distorted sex ratio eased over the subsequent decades as 
the apartheid government forcibly removed millions of African residents from white areas.  By 
the 1980s, there were 69 men for every 100 women in the homelands (Wilson 1972; Simkins 
1983; Moultrie 2001).  This balancing of sex ratios may have made family formation in the 
homelands easier over time. 
These internal migration restrictions and segmented labor markets generated incentives to 
have fewer children in white areas.  However, there is insufficient annual information on forced 
removals or labor market conditions to properly control for these factors when tracking birth 
rates over time.  Therefore, although I do not know of evidence that these factors changed 
sharply in 1970 in a way that could explain suddenly lower relative fertility in white areas, I 
cannot conclude that public provision of family planning services alone changed relative fertility 
rates in white areas and homelands after 1970.  I will only be able to conclude that the coincident 
timing of family planning expansion and fertility changes in white areas suggests that, in 
combination with economic, social, and political factors, rising public provision of family 
planning services led to changes in fertility. 
 
2.3.2  Data on Use of Contraception and Fertility 
 
South Africa’s Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) conducted several surveys 
during the apartheid era that recorded use of contraception by married African women.  Surveys 
in 1969 and 1982 were administered only in white areas, but surveys in 1974 and 1987 were 
administered nationwide and allow a comparison between use of contraception among African 
women living in white areas and African women living in homelands (Du Plessis and Coetzee 
1974, Van Tonder 1985, Caldwell and Caldwell 1993).  After a series of reports in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, the 1974 Fertility Survey remained unused in the HSRC archives (Lötter and 
Van Tonder 1976, Lötter 1977).  In 2014, with the assistance of several HSRC staff and 
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researchers, I was able to locate the survey records on an IBM datatape and convert the tape into 
modern computer format.  The 1987 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) is available at the 
National Research Foundation’s South African Data Archive.  By using both surveys, this paper 
for the first time tracks use of contraception by African residents over time in both white areas 
and homelands. 
Demographic measurement of African residents was incomplete during the apartheid era.  
The national government maintained vital registries of births for White, coloured, and Asian but 
not African residents, and censuses were often incompletely administered in African 
communities (Moultrie and Timaeus 2003).  In this paper, I use household surveys that record 
the timing of each of a woman’s births and offer the most representative record of African 
fertility in both white areas and homelands.  Birth history surveys suffer from four shortcomings, 
discussed below.  Despite these shortcomings, birth histories have been used in studies of 
fertility in South Africa and elsewhere (Burger et al. 2012, Bongaarts and Casterline 2013). 
First, birth history surveys do not record births to women who have died.  Because the 
apartheid government did not maintain registries of deaths of African residents, it is not possible 
to adjust later birth histories for mortality in white areas and homelands. 
Second, mothers may inaccurately report their children’s dates of birth or may not report 
children who have died (Potter 1977, Beckett et al. 2001).  Among all children born between 
1953 and 1992 that appear in the main dataset used in this paper, 22.2 percent are recorded as 
having been born in years ending in 0 or 5, above the expected 20 percent in truly random large 
sample.  This birth-year heaping suggests some misreporting of children’s dates of birth, but is of 
similar magnitude in white areas and homelands (22.4 percent and 21.8 percent), suggesting 
similar ability to remember and report previous births. 
Third, while the retrospective nature of birth histories permits calculation of fertility rates 
in the years leading up to the survey, these surveys are often collected only from women 
currently of childbearing age.  Although they comprehensively measure fertility at time of 
survey, births many years earlier are only recorded if the mothers were young at the time.  
Because all birth history surveys were conducted at and after the end of apartheid, the fertility 
statistics that I calculate in the early years of apartheid come from women who were young at the 
time. 
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Fourth, birth history surveys do not record each child’s place of birth.  This final 
shortcoming is particularly relevant for South Africa.  More than 3 million African residents 
were forcibly removed from white areas during apartheid, and there was substantial internal 
migration after mobility restrictions were lifted in 1985 (Platzky and Walker 1985, Reed 2013).  
Where a woman currently lives may not be where she gave birth.  Because migration itself could 
be a consequence of family planning if women with access to contraception were able to delay 
childbearing and migrate in search of work, I use a woman’s place of birth to represent where 
she lived during her childbearing years. 
Three surveys conducted during and after the end of apartheid record women’s complete 
birth histories and place of birth: the 1987 DHS, 1994 and 1995 October Household Surveys 
(OHS), and the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) that began in 2008.  The DHS records 
birth histories from women ages 15–49 who are married or have ever given birth, and records 
whether each woman was born in a white area or homeland.  The OHS records birth histories 
from all women ages 12–54 regardless of marriage status, and records each woman’s magisterial 
district of birth, the land area of all of which lie at least 90% in an apartheid-era white area or 
apartheid-era homeland.  The NIDS records birth histories from all women regardless of age or 
marriage status, but records place of birth according to post-apartheid district council boundaries, 
many of which substantially overlap both historical white areas and historical homelands.  So 
that I may measure fertility regardless of marriage status, I use the OHS and NIDS data in this 
paper.  To minimize white area/homeland location measurement error, I use OHS records for the 
main analyses, and supplement with NIDS records to measure long-term cohort fertility.  I mark 
as white areas all post-apartheid districts in which at least 90 percent of the land area covers 
historical white areas.  I mark all other districts as homelands. 
 
2.4  Results 
 
2.4.1  Increased Use of Contraception 
 
Increased use of contraception accompanied the increase in public provision of family 
planning services during the 1970s and 1980s.  As given in panel (a) of Figure 2.4, 32 percent of 
African women living in white areas in 1974 had ever used contraception.  In the homelands, this 
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figure was lower, at 15 percent.  By the late 1980s, the share of women who had ever used 
contraception rose by nearly 40 percentage points in both white areas and homelands.  As given 
in panel (b), the share of women currently using contraception similarly rose over time 
countrywide and remained higher in white areas.  These statistics indicate that, between the early 
1970s and late 1980s, use of contraception among African women rose substantially and African 
women living in white areas remained consistently more likely to use contraception than African 
women living in homelands.  As given in panel (c), among African women that were using 
contraception, those living in white areas in 1987 had been doing so for 44 months on average, 3 
months longer than women in homelands. 
African women living in white areas were also consistently more likely to report having 
access to family planning services.  As given in panel (d), 9 percent of African women living in 
white areas in 1974 had been visited by a family planning advisor in the past year.  In 
homelands, this figure stood at 2 percent.  Similarly, as given in panel (e), 16 percent of African 
women living in white areas in the late 1980s received contraception from a mobile clinic or 
family planning advisor, but only 6 percent of African women in homelands did so.  However, as 
given in panel (f), reported intentions to use contraception varied little between white areas and 
homelands: 49 percent of African women living in white areas in 1987 reported that they 
intended to use contraception in the future, a figure that was just one percentage point lower in 
the homelands. 
Although there was no measurement of the use of contraception in both white areas and 
homelands before national government involvement in family planning, the evidence in Figure 
2.4 shows that, once the family planning program was underway in the 1970s and 1980s, African 
women in white areas were consistently more likely to use contraception than were women in 
homelands.  Visits by family planning advisors and mobile clinics were more common in white 
and may have facilitated greater use of contraception in white areas.  Women living in 
homelands likely had to travel further to obtain contraception.  However, reported intentions to 
use contraception, while only a course measure of demand, suggests that desire to use 
contraception was roughly the same countrywide.  Therefore, widespread provision of family 
planning services in white areas, rather than stronger demand for contraception in white areas, 
may have been responsible for greater use of contraception in white areas.  In the next section, I 
show that differences in fertility accompanied these differences in use of contraception. 
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2.4.2  Fertility Decline in White Areas Relative to Homelands 
 
Fertility rates in white areas and homelands diverged in the early 1970s.  As shown in the 
first panel of Figure 2.5, through the 1960s the annual share of African woman born in white 
areas that gave birth was the same as the share of African women born in homelands gave birth.  
As the government first provided family planning services in white areas, African fertility in 
white areas fell relative to African fertility in homelands.  In 1960, about 3 percent of women 
born in white areas and homelands gave birth; in 1977, 9 percent of women born in white areas 
gave birth while 13 percent of women born in homelands gave birth.  (Again, the share of 
women giving birth appears to rise in the 1950s and 1960s in both white areas and homelands 
because of sample censoring: the OHS records only women who were teenagers in the 1950s, but 
by the 1970s a wider age range of mothers are recorded.) 
The relative decline in fertility in white areas was substantial.  The following event study 
difference-in-differences, or interrupted time series, calculates the difference in fertility among 
African women born in white areas and homelands in each year minus the difference in 1969, the 
year before the government first directly provided family planning services: 
 
bit = α𝐿𝑖 + ∑ βy1(t = y)
y≠1969
 + ∑ δy𝐿𝑖 × 1(t = y)
y≠1969
 + εit.                                     (1) 
 
Each woman, i, has a separate observation for each year, t, in which she was between the ages of 
12 and 54.  bit equals one if woman i gave birth in year t, 𝐿𝑖 equals one if woman i was born in a 
white area, and 1(t = y) equals one if t = y for years y ≠ 1969.  The δy coefficients presented in 
the second panel of Figure 2.5 provide the difference-in-differences estimates of the likelihood of 
giving birth in white areas minus homelands in year y minus the difference in 1969.  At its nadir 
in 1977, the difference in the share of women born in white areas that gave birth minus the share 
of women born in homelands that gave birth was nearly 4 percentage points lower than in 1969.  
Given that 13 percent of African women born in homelands gave birth in 1977, this difference 
stood at nearly one-third of African fertility in the homelands in 1977.  Fertility rates in white 
areas and homelands converged somewhat in the 1980s. 
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2.4.3  Robustness of Fertility Decline across Subgroups 
 
Among African women observed in the 1994 and 1995 OHS, women born in white areas 
and women born in homelands are not balanced across demographic characteristics.  Women 
born in white areas are older, have more standards of schooling (roughly equivalent to years of 
schooling), are more likely to live in an urban area, and are more likely to have ever been 
married than those born in homelands (Table 2.1).  Figure 2.6 repeats the difference-in 
differences estimates presented in the second panel of Figure 2.5 for subsamples grouped 
according to women’s birth cohort, educational attainment, urban/rural residence, and marriage 
status.  Because of small sample sizes in some years, these estimates of δy are calculated as 
follows for five-year groups (y = 1955–59, 1960–64, …, 1990–94): 
 
bit = α𝐿𝑖 + ∑ βy1(t = y)
y≠1965−69
 + ∑ δy𝐿𝑖 × 1(t = y)
y≠1965−69
 + εit.                                 (2) 
 
Panel (a) of Figure 2.6 demonstrates that, among women born in the early 1940s, the 
likelihood of giving birth fell by four percentage points during the 1970s for women born in 
white areas relative to women born in homelands.  Panels (b) through (d) similarly indicate that 
relative fertility fell in white areas in the 1970s for women born in the late 1940s, early 1950s, 
and late 1950s.  Panels (e) and (f) demonstrate that the decline in fertility was of similar 
magnitude among more and less-educated women.  Panels (g) and (h) demonstrate that the 
decline was earliest and most persistent among women living in urban areas, consistent with the 
rollout of clinics and family planning advisors first in urban areas and then in rural areas 
(Department of Health 1976).  Similarly, panels (i) and (j) demonstrate that the decline was 
earliest and most persistent among women who had ever been married.  Again, though, 
educational attainment, urban/rural residence, and marriage status were measured only in 1994 
and 1995, after women had made childbearing decisions.  Available data do not permit 
measuring changes in fertility by contemporary educational attainment, urban/rural residence, or 
marriage status. 
 
 
66 
2.4.4  Deferral of Childbearing and Decline in Lifetime Fertility 
 
Figure 2.5 indicates that, relative to birth rates in homelands, birth rates in white areas 
declined in the 1970s and then partially rebounded in the 1980s.  Figure 2.7 demonstrates that 
deferral of childbearing in white areas contributed to this pattern.  The estimates in Figure 2.7 are 
calculated using a sample of women age 40 and above when observed in the 2008 NIDS.  While 
some women give birth after turning 40, this age is commonly used as a cutoff to identify women 
who have plausibly completed childbearing (Modrek and Ghobadi 2011, Beaujouan and Solaz 
2013, Cornolli and Bernardi 2015).  Panel (a) of Figure 2.7 presents the average age at first birth 
among African women born in white areas and African women born in homelands.  These 
averages are calculated for five-year birth cohorts of women.  For example, women born in white 
areas in the late 1930s first gave birth on average at age 25, as did women born in homelands.  
Relative age at first birth declined for cohorts of women born in white areas in the 1940s, but 
rose starting with cohorts of women born in the early 1950s.  Panel (b) demonstrates that average 
age at last birth remained consistently lower in white areas than in homelands.  But, as with age 
at first birth, relative age at last birth started to rise for cohorts of women born in white areas in 
the 1950s.  Panel (c) demonstrates that average spacing between births also started to lengthen 
for cohorts of women born in white areas in the 1950s. 
Bongaarts (1999) demonstrates how deferral of childbearing can lead to a temporary 
decline in fertility but may leave lifetime fertility unchanged.  Panels (a) through (c) of Figure 
2.7 together suggest that deferral of childbearing may explain the drop in relative fertility in 
white areas in the 1970s followed by a rebound in the 1980s, depicted in Figure 2.5.  Starting 
with cohorts of women born in the early 1950s, who were entering their twenties just as the 
national government began directly providing family planning services in the early 1970s, 
women born in white areas began giving birth later in life, had greater spacing between births, 
and stopped giving birth later in life.  These patterns contribute to a deferral of childbearing from 
the 1970s into the 1980s.  Longer spacing between births improves each child’s likelihood of 
survival, and South African women’s use of contraception to postpone and spread out births is 
consistent with use of contraception for similar purposes in other parts of Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Lesthaeghe et al. 1981, Cohen 1998, Westoff 2006). 
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However, deferral of childbearing alone does not account for the entire drop in fertility in 
white areas in the 1970s.  As given in panel (d) of Figure 2.7, lifetime fertility was more than 
five children per woman for cohorts of women born through the late 1940s, regardless of 
whether the women were born in white areas or homelands.  Fertility fell countrywide for 
women born starting in the 1950s, but this drop was particularly precipitous among women born 
in white areas.  For cohorts of women born in the early 1950s through the early 1960s, women 
born in white areas had one fewer child on average than did women born in homelands.  Given 
that women born in homelands in the 1960s had four children each on average, this difference in 
lifetime fertility of one child per woman suggests that government provision of family planning 
services accounted for up to a 25 percent drop in fertility among African residents of white areas. 
A decline in the share of women with large families drove this drop in average number of 
children born per woman.  Figure 2.8 presents the distribution of African women by their 
number of children.  Among African women born in white areas in the late 1930s, few had zero 
children or one child.  The shares of women with two, three, and four children were each roughly 
15 percent.  The remaining 55 percent of women had five or more children.  Among African 
women born in homelands in the late 1930s, few had zero children, the shares with one, two, 
three, and four children were each about 10 percent, and the remaining 60 percent of women had 
five or more children.  These family sizes persisted for cohorts of women born in the 1940s: in 
both white areas and homelands, more than half of women had five or more children.  Starting 
with cohorts of African women born in the early 1950s, lifetime fertility declined countrywide, 
but this decline was steepest among women born in white areas.  Among women born in white 
areas the early 1960s, a two-child family was most common, and only 20 percent of women had 
five or more children.  Among women born in homelands, the share with two, three, and four 
children rose slightly over the 1950s, but by the early 1960s a five-child family remained most 
common.   
 
2.5  Family Planning, Fertility, and a Legacy of Apartheid 
 
Over the last half of the twentieth century, the total fertility rate nearly halved among 
African residents of South Africa but barely declined in the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa.  This 
remarkable decline in fertility occurred during the formation, entrenchment, decay, and ultimate 
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dissolution of the apartheid state in South Africa.  Starting in the early 1970s, the national 
government provided free family planning services in white areas of the country.  Although 
many African leaders expressed apprehension, over the following two decades rates use of 
contraception among African women doubled and birth rates fell.  Despite a rebound in 
childbearing in the 1980s, lifetime fertility fell by one child per woman in white areas relative to 
homelands during the last half of the apartheid era. 
Available fertility records do not permit calculation of the number of births that the 
family planning program may have averted.  The apartheid government did not maintain vital 
records of African residents, censuses did not fully cover all homelands, and most household 
surveys conducted after the end of apartheid collected birth histories only from women who were 
young during the early years of the family planning program.  However, the total drop in fertility 
in the country serves as an extreme upper bound on the number of births averted.  In 1969, the 
year before the apartheid government first provided free family planning services, 21.921 million 
people lived in South Africa and the crude birth rate was 38.047 births per 1,000 residents, 
indicating that 834,000 children were born in 1969 (21.921 million × 0.038047).  The lower line 
in Figure 2.9 depicts the actual numbers of births calculated similarly for each year from 1970 
until apartheid ended in 1994.  The slope of this line falls over time because the crude birth rate 
fell to 26.474 in 1994.  Had 1969’s crude birth rate of 38.047 persisted through 1994, the 
population would have grown more quickly and there would have been more births each year.   
The upper line in Figure 2.9 provides the number of births that would had occurred had 1969’s 
birth rate persisted. 
The difference between the two lines in Figure 2.9, 5.13 million, provides a rough 
approximation of the number of births that were averted during the last half of the apartheid era.  
Family planning was one of many factors that may have led to this decline in births, so 5.13 
million is an extreme upper bound on the number of births that government provision of family 
planning services averted during the apartheid era.  Between 1970 and 1994, the apartheid 
government spent $779 million (2012 USD) on family planning and population development, 
yielding an estimated cost per averted birth between 1970 and 1994 of at least $152 ($779 
million ÷ 5.13 million). 
Table 2.3 compares the effects of family planning programs in several countries.  
Although the drop in fertility was of similar magnitude in South Africa as in other countries, the 
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cost per averted birth in South Africa may have matched or exceeded that in the Matlab region of 
Bangladesh.  As in Bangladesh, South Africa’s family planning program involved intense 
outreach over many years and was effective but expensive (Joshi and Schultz 2007).  Given that 
the largest relative decline in lifetime fertility in white areas occurred for African women born in 
the early 1950s, who were just entering their main childbearing ages as the national government 
first provided family planning services in the early 1970s, the marginal effectiveness of 
additional increases in government expenditure on family planning appears to have been quite 
low.  This conclusion confirms Caldwell and Caldwell’s (1993) assertion that South Africa’s 
fertility decline was not as large as might have been expected given the national government’s 
substantial attention to family planning. 
The full consequences of family planning in South Africa extend beyond a tally of 
averted births.  Family planning was central to the apartheid state’s population control 
objectives: slower population growth among African residents in white areas would permit the 
government to maintain power.  Family planning effectively lowered fertility but did not achieve 
its political objective, at least not for long: apartheid formally ended in 1994, barely twenty years 
after the government first provided family planning services.  By expanding access to family 
planning services to members of all racial groups, government provision of family planning 
narrowed the racial gap in access to health care.  However, these services were available mostly 
in white areas.  The homelands remained poorer than the rest of the country during the apartheid 
era and after reunification, and family planning was one of many apartheid policies that 
entrenched differences between African residents of white areas and African residents of the 
homelands. 
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2.7  Data Sources 
 
Household surveys 
Human Sciences Research Council.  1974.  Fertility Survey. 
Human Sciences Research Council.  1999.  Demographic and Health Survey, 1987.  
Available at <http://sada.nrf.ac.za/ahdetails.asp?catalognumber=0115>, accessed 
June 10, 2013. 
Central Statistical Service.  1994 and 1995.  “October Household Survey.”  Available at 
<http://www.datafirst.uct.ac.za/>, accessed August 6, 2013. 
Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit.  2008.  “National Income 
Dynamics Study.”  Available at <http://www.datafirst.uct.ac.za/>, accessed 
January 14, 2013 
 
Expenditure on family planning services 
Estimates of Expenditure, published by national and homeland governments as follows 
Republic of South Africa: 1950–1994 
Bophuthatswana: 1978–1994 
Ciskei, 1981–1994 
Gazankulu, 1980–1993 
Kangwane, 1990 
KwaNdebele, 1982–1988 and 1991–1994 
Kwazulu, 1979–1994 
Lebowa, 1977–1981 
Qwaqwa, 1978–1994 
Transkei, 1975–1989 
Venda, 1978–1985 and 1990 
 
Political demarcations 
Homelands 
Municipal Demarcation Board.  2014.  “Districts.”  Available at 
<http://www.demarcation.org.za>, accessed August 18, 2014. 
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Magisterial districts in 1991 
Giraut, Frédéric, and Céline Vacchiani-Marcuzzo.  2009.  Territories and Urbanisation 
in South Africa: Atlas and Geo-Historical Information System (DYSTURB).  
Marseille: IRD. 
District councils in 2001 
Statistics South Africa.  2014.  “District Councils.” 
 
Population 
South Africa, 1950–1989 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.  2014.  “Stat Extracts.”  
Available at <http://www.stats.oecd.org>, accessed August 25, 2014. 
All homelands in 1970 except KwaNdebele and Lebowa 
Bureau for Economic Research re Bantu Development (BENBO).  1976.  Economic 
Revue.  Pretoria: BENBO.  [Individual publications for each homeland] 
Lebowa in 1970 
Bureau for Economic Research re Bantu Development (BENBO).  1976.  Black 
Development in South Africa.  Pretoria: BENBO.  [Table 2.B.15.1] 
All homelands in 1985 
Mostert, W.P., J.L. van Tonder, and B.E. Hofmeyr.  1988.  “Demographic Trends in 
South Africa.”  Chapter 4 in South Africa: Perspectives on the Future, ed. H.C. 
Marais.  Pinetown, South Africa: Owen Burgess.  [Table 2.2] 
 
Birth and death rates 
Total fertility rate in South Africa and in Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole 
United Nations.  2014.  “UNdata.”  Available at 
<http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=PopDiv&f=variableID:54>, accessed February 
14, 2014. 
Crude birth rate and crude death rate in South Africa 
World Bank.  2016.  “World Data Bank.”  Available at <http://data.worldbank.org/>, 
accessed March 18, 2016. 
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Prices 
Price index for all retail items in South Africa, 1950–1957 
South African Reserve Bank.  1960.  Quarterly Bulletin of Statistics, No. 58, December 
1960.  Pretoria, South Africa: Republic of South Africa. 
Consumer price index in South Africa, 1957–2012 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.  2014.  “Stat Extracts.”  
Available at <http://www.stats.oecd.org>, accessed August 25, 2014. 
 
Exchange rates 
Currency conversion from Pound to South African Rand at rate of 2 Rand per Pound 
Reserve Bank.  2001.  “The Reserve Bank and the Rand: Some Historic Reflections.”  
Available at <https://www.resbank.co.za/Publications/Speeches/Detail-Item-
View/Pages/default.aspx?sarbweb=3b6aa07d-92ab-441f-b7bf-
bb7dfb1bedb4&sarblist=a01d874c-c3f6-4b93-a9dc-
c984cf8652cf&sarbitem=200>, accessed August 25, 2014. 
Exchange rate of 8.0396 Rand per US Dollar on January 1, 2012 
OANDA.  2014.  “Historical Exchange Rates.”  Available at  
<http://www.oanda.com/currency/historical-rates/>, accessed September 8, 2014. 
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Table 2.1: Sample Characteristics 
 
 Born in 
white areas 
Born in 
homelands Difference 
Number of women 41,521 28,161  
Average age at survey 
31.648 
(0.088) 
30.699 
(0.116) 
0.949 
(0.146) 
Average number of standards of schooling 
5.200 
(0.018) 
4.841 
(0.021) 
0.359 
(0.028) 
Share that live in an urban area 
0.541 
(0.003) 
0.147 
(0.002) 
0.394 
(0.003) 
Share that have ever been married 0.431 
(0.003) 
0.400 
(0.003) 
0.031 
(0.004) 
 
Notes: Sample consists of all African women ages 12–54 observed in 1994 and 1995 October Household Surveys 
who were born in a white area or born in a homeland.  Standard errors given in parentheses.  Source: See Data 
Sources. 
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Table 2.2: Reductions in Fertility Attributable to Family Planning Programs 
 
 Dates  
Absolute 
reduction in 
children born 
per woman  
Percent 
reduction in 
children born 
per woman  
Cost per 
birth averted 
(2012 USD) 
South Africa 1970 – 1989  ≤1  ≤25  ≥$152 
Bangladesh (Matlab)[A] 1978 – 1985    21  $384 
Colombia[B] 1964 – 1993  0.25 – 0.33  5  $124 – $167 
Ethiopia[C] 1990 – 2004  1  20   
Ghana (Navrongo)[D] 1993 – 1999  1  15   
Indonesia[E] 1982 – 1987  0.04 – 0.08  1 – 2   
Iran[F] 1967 – 2006    18 – 28   
Peru[G] 1985 – 1991  0.93 – 1.30  25 – 35   
Tanzania[H] 1970 – 1991    10.9 – 21.0   
United States[I] 1988 – 2003    1.7 – 8.9  $6,800 
 
Notes:  Values for South Africa described in Sections 2.4 and 2.5.  Sources: [A] Simmons et al. 1991, [B] Miller 
2009, [C] Portner et al. 2011, [D] Phillips et al. 2006, [E] Gertler and Molyneaux 1994, [F] Modrek and Ghobadi 
2011, [G] Angeles et al. 2005, [H] Angeles et al. 1998, [I] Kearney and Levine 2009. 
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Figure 2.1: Total Fertility Rate and Government Spending Per Capita on Family Planning 
 
 
 
Notes: The total fertility rate is for all residents of South Africa.  Spending per capita calculated to equal national 
government spending divided by the total population of South Africa.  Nominal spending on family planning (not 
per capita) remained steady or rose in every year between 1950 and 1994 except for declines in 1974 and 1993.  
Sources: See Data Sources. 
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Figure 2.2: Partitioning of South Africa during Apartheid 
 
 
 
Source: See Data Sources. 
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Figure 2.3: Homeland Government Spending per Capita on Family Planning as a 
Percentage of National Government Spending per Capita on Family Planning 
 
 
 
Notes: For each year, this plot includes only those homelands for which I have been able to locate expenditure 
reports that itemize health department spending.  For many homelands, family planning spending is sometimes not 
provided.  Most years’ reports provide detail on dozens or hundreds of categories of health spending and rarely list 
expenditure of zero for any category.  Omission of family planning from a report in which other categories of health 
spending are listed likely suggests that the homeland government did not fund family planning, not that family 
planning spending is lumped in with another category of spending.  I therefore treat missing family planning 
spending as zero.  Excluding these missing values shifts the plot up by roughly two percentage points and does not 
substantially change the conclusion that the national government provided much greater funding for family planning 
than did homeland governments.  Only in Venda in 1979 and 1982 did a single homeland’s per-capita expenditure 
on family planning approach half that of the national government.  Population counts are available every year for the 
country as a whole, in 1970 for all homelands except KwaNdebele, and in 1985 for all homelands.  For all 
homelands except KwaNdebele, I impute missing annual population counts assuming constant growth between 1970 
and 1985, and assuming that the homeland grew at the same rate as the country as a whole after 1985.  I impute 
missing annual KwaNdebele population counts by assuming it grew at the same rate as the country as a whole.  
National government spending is divided by the population of white areas, which is calculated as the population of 
the country as a whole minus the population of all homelands.  Sources: See Data Sources. 
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Figure 2.4: Use of and Access to Contraception among African Women 
 
 
 
Notes on 1974: Sample consists of African women ages 15–44 who have had at least one child and are married or 
living with a man.  Of the 6,000 cases originally collected, 5,792 remain.  Notes on 1987–89: Sample consists of 
African women ages 12–49 who have given birth, have ever been in a union, or are pregnant.  Calculations 
performed using weights that accompany the survey.  Sources: See Data Sources. 
  
85 
Figure 2.5: Share of African Women that Gave Birth, by Year 
 
 
 
Notes: Sample consists of all African women ages 12–54 observed in 1994 and 1995 October Household Surveys 
who were born in a white area or born in a homeland.  Data reshaped to consist of one observation per woman per 
year for each year the woman was age 12–54.  Calculations performed using weights that accompany each survey.  
The second graph plots δy from specification 1 in Section 2.4.2, where the omitted year is 1969 (the year before the 
national government fully funded all family planning clinics and began to directly provide family planning services).  
Source: See Data Sources. 
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Figure 2.6: Robustness of Difference-in-Differences Estimates 
 
 
 
Notes: Sample as given in Figure 2.5.  Calculations performed according to specification 2 in Section 2.4.3 for 
various subgroups of women.  For example, the sample in panel (a) is restricted to women born between 1940 and 
1944.  Educational attainment, urban/rural location, and marriage status are observed in 1994 and 1995. 
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Figure 2.7: Characteristics of Childbearing, by Women’s Year of Birth 
 
 
 
Notes: X-axis in each figure tracks women’s year of birth.  Sample consists of all African women age 40 or above 
when observed in 2008 National Income Dynamics Study who were born in a white area or born in a homeland.  
Calculations performed using weights that accompany the survey.  Source: See Data Sources. 
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Figure 2.8: Distribution of Total Number of Children, by Women’s Year of Birth 
 
 
 
Notes: Sample as given in Figure 2.7. 
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Figure 2.9: Births in South Africa, 1969–1994 
 
 
 
Notes: The lower line plots the actual of births in each year, which equal the total population multiplied by the crude 
birth rate.  For example, in 1969 there were 21,920,560 people in South Africa, the crude birth rate was 38.047 per 
thousand people, and there were 834,012 births (21,920,560 × 0.038047).  Between 1969 and 1994, the crude birth 
rate fell from 38.047 births per thousand people to 26.474.  The upper line plots the number of births there would 
have been had 1969’s crude birth rate persisted unchanged through 1994.  For example, in 1970 there were 
22,502,430 residents of South Africa, the crude birth rate was 37.883 per thousand people, the crude death rate was 
13.879 per thousand people, and the net migration rate was 2.6371 per thousand people.  (Sources for the 
population, crude birth rate, and crude death rate are given in the Data Sources.  Net migration is calculated to equal 
the change in population minus births plus deaths.)  There were therefore 852,460 births, 312,311 deaths, and 59,342 
net migrants (immigrants minus emigrants) in 1970.  At 1969’s higher crude birth rate, there would have been 
856,150 births in 1970, a rise of 3,690 over the actual number.  This rise in births would have in turn raised 
population in 1971 from 23,101,920 to 23,105,610.  In 1971, the crude birth rate was 37.775, the crude death rate 
was 13.569, and the net migration rate was 29.507.  There were therefore 872,213 births in 1971 (23,101,920 × 
0.037755).  Had 1969’s birth rate persisted, there would have been 879,099 births in 1970 (23,105,610 × 0.038047), 
an increase of 6,886 births.  There would also have been more deaths and net migrants, and the population in 1972 
would have been 23,739,366 instead of its actual value of 23,728,830.  The number of births in each following year 
are calculated similarly.  In total, the decline in the crude birth rate averted 5.13 million births between 1970 and 
1994 (this is the area of the gray region on the graph).  Family planning was one of many factors that may have led 
to this decline in births, so 5.13 million is an extreme upper bound on the number of births that government 
provision of family planning services averted during the last half of the apartheid era. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
Do Family Planning Programs Decrease Poverty? 
Evidence from Public Census Data 
 
(with Martha J. Bailey and Olga Malkova) 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
With U.S. income inequality soaring to its highest level in almost a century (Saez 2013), 
increasing the economic opportunities of poor children is a growing policy concern.  Poor 
children are significantly more likely to experience delayed academic development, have health 
problems, live in more dangerous neighborhoods, and attend underperforming schools (Levine 
and Zimmerman 2010).  In the longer-term, children from poorer households have lower test 
scores (Reardon 2011) are less likely to complete high school, enroll in college, and, conditional 
upon enrolling, complete college (Bailey and Dynarski 2011), which limits their earnings 
potential as adults.  Ultimately, over 40 percent of children born to parents in the lowest quintile 
of family income remain in that income quintile as adults (Pew Charitable Trusts 2012).   
This paper explores the role of family planning programs as a public policy strategy to 
improve children’s economic resources in childhood.  The rationale that family planning 
programs would increase children’s resources and opportunities was integral to their inclusion in 
U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson’s War on Poverty, which began in 1964.  Five years later, 
when campaigning for a national family planning program, President Richard Nixon asserted 
their more direct connection to children’s economic disadvantage: “Unwanted or untimely 
childbearing is one of several forces which are driving many families into poverty or keeping 
them in that condition” (July 18, 1969). 
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A long theoretical tradition in economics also rationalizes a causal link running from 
children’s economic resources, to their lifetime opportunities, and ultimately to their adult 
outcomes.1  This link occurs both through income and price channels.  More affluent parents not 
only have more economic resources, but they may invest more in each child and have fewer 
children if the income elasticity of parental investments in children (“child quality”) exceeds the 
income elasticity of child quantity (Becker and Lewis 1973, Willis 1973).  Having fewer 
children, in turn, reduces the shadow price of child quality and further encourages investment in 
children.  In addition, credit constraints may lead poorer families to underinvest in their 
children’s formal human capital (Becker and Tomes 1979, 1986). 
Family planning programs could increase investments in children through both income 
and price channels.  First, they may induce greater parental investments in their children by 
reducing the relative price of child quality.  Second, they may raise the incomes of the average 
parent, for instance by reducing the cost of delaying childbearing so that parents can themselves 
increase their human capital investments, find better partners, and, ultimately, earn higher wages 
(Christenson 2011, Rotz 2011, Bailey et al. 2012).  Family planning programs could also raise 
the family income of the average child as they disproportionately allow poorer households to 
delay or avoid additional childbearing.   
This paper provides new empirical evidence on the relationship of family planning 
programs to child poverty rates, both in the short and long-run.  Building on Bailey’s (2012) 
research design, we exploit the roll-out of U.S. federally funded family planning grants from 
1964 to 1973.  The first U.S. family planning programs were quietly funded under the 1964 
Economic Opportunity Act and the program expanded under the Family Planning Services and 
Population Research Act (P.L. 91-572).2  This legislation supported the opening of new clinics in 
                                                 
1 Thomas Malthus popularized the link between childbearing and poverty in his Essay on the Principle of 
Population (1798).  Malthus argued that this link was rooted in the arithmetic growth of agricultural yields being 
outstripped by the exponential growth of population.  Left unchecked, population growth would outstrip the growth 
in agricultural production and result in a subsistence economy.   
2 Before 1965, U.S. federal involvement and investments in family planning had been modest.  This reflected the 
view expressed by President Dwight Eisenhower in 1959, who said that he could not “imagine anything more 
emphatically a subject that is not a proper political or government activity or function or responsibility… The 
government will not, so long as I am here, have a positive political doctrine in its program that has to do with the 
problem of birth control.  That’s not our business” (Tone 2001, p. 214).  According to 1967 estimates, expenditure 
for family planning through the Maternal and Child Health programs (started in 1942; U.S. Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare [DHEW] 1974, p. 3, citing a 1942 memorandum from Surgeon General Thomas Parran to 
state health departments) and the Maternal and Infant Care programs under the 1963 Social Security Amendments 
were small (U.S. DHEW 1974, p. 3, citing House Appropriations Committee hearings; U.S. DHEW 1967, p. 988). 
92 
disadvantaged areas and, to a lesser extent, the expansion of existing family planning programs.  
Federal family planning dollars funded education, counseling, and the provision of low-cost 
contraceptives and related medical services; they did not fund abortion, which remained illegal in 
most states until 1973.  Use of these programs was not explicitly means tested, but programs 
tended to benefit lower income women. 
Our research design compares the poverty rates of individuals born in the years leading 
up to and just after federally funded family planning programs began.  We draw upon several 
public-use datasets that measure individuals’ ages and place of residence: the 1980 US decennial 
census observes the potentially affected cohorts as children and the 2000 census and 2005–2011 
American Community Survey (ACS) observes the same cohorts as adults.   
Our results show that federally funded family planning programs are associated with 
significant reductions in child poverty rates and, later, poverty rates in adulthood.3  Individuals 
born one to six years after program funding were 4.2 percent less likely to live in poverty in 
childhood and 2.4 percent less likely to live in poverty in adulthood.  Although both white and 
nonwhite children born after family planning programs began experienced large reductions in 
childhood poverty, white children experienced greater relative reductions in poverty rates in 
adulthood.  Whites born after family planning programs began were 4.1 percent less likely to live 
in poverty in childhood and 6.1 percent less likely to live in poverty in adulthood.  Nonwhites 
born after family planning programs began were 8.2 percent less likely to live in poverty in 
childhood, but 2 percent less likely to live in poverty in adulthood.   
In short, family planning programs may help break the cycle of poverty.  Our results 
suggest that family planning programs reduce poverty among children and, ultimately, in 
adulthood.  These findings complement a growing body of research that suggests that investments 
in children can have sizable effects on children’s longer-term educational attainment, health, and 
labor market productivity (Cunha and Heckman 2007, Almond and Currie 2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Poverty rates in this paper are defined using the official U.S. measure. 
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3.2  The Initiation and Potential Impact of U.S. Family Planning Programs 
 
Margaret Sanger’s zealous advocacy of what became known as “birth control” is often 
credited to her encounters with child poverty.  Her work as a maternity nurse on the Lower East 
Side of New York City took her to the residences of poor families with many children living in 
squalor.  She also encountered women who died (or nearly died) from attempted abortions or 
debilitating contraceptive techniques.4  The best medical recommendation of the day to prevent 
unwanted childbearing (as related in a letter to Sanger) was often to tell one’s husband to “sleep 
on the roof.” 
 
3.2.1  The Initiation of U.S. Family Planning Programs, 1964 to 1973 
 
The introduction of the first oral contraceptive gave women and physicians much more 
reliable, safer, and enjoyable options.  Its expense, however, prohibited many women from using 
it.  Differences in access to “the Pill” led many to advocate for federal subsidies.  Largely due to 
these efforts, federal grants for family planning began under the Economic Opportunity Act 
(EOA 1964, Public Law 88-452), a key piece of President Johnson’s War on Poverty.5  Between 
1965 and 1970, federal outlays for family planning through the OEO rose more than twenty-fold, 
from 1.6 to 41 million (2008 dollars).  This increase reflects two important sets of policy 
changes.  The first was the 1967 Amendments to the EOA (Public Law 90-222, Title II, Section 
222a), which designated family planning as a “national emphasis” program.  The second was the 
increase in outlays under President Nixon, who became president in 1969.  The November 1970 
enactment of Title X of the Public Health Services Act allowed the Department of Health 
Education and Welfare (DHEW) to make grants to local organizations directly and prohibited the 
use of federal funds “in programs where abortion is a method of family planning” (DHEW 
                                                 
4 One letter to Margaret Sanger read, “I am the mother of two lovely little girls.  I have been married fifteen years.  I 
married at the age of fifteen to escape a home that was overcrowded with unloved and unwanted children, where 
there was never clothing or food enough to divide among the eight of us…I have been pregnant 15 times, most of 
the time doing things myself to get out of it and no one knows how I have suffered from the effect of it, but I would 
rather die than bring as many children into the world as my mother did and have nothing to offer them” (Sanger 
1923).   
5 According to 1967 estimates, expenditures for family planning through the Maternal and Child Health programs 
(started in 1942) and the Maternal and Infant Care programs under the 1963 Social Security Amendment were small 
(DHEW 1974, p. 3).   
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1008).  After the enactment of Title X, federal outlays for family planning increased by another 
50 percent by 1973. 
Federally funded family planning programs provided access to birth control as well as 
related education and counseling services.  These programs tended to open in locations whose 
residents had limited access to family planning services.  In many locations, no program existed 
prior to the federal grant.  In others, programs had existed but were much smaller in scale.  
Consequently, the federal grants significantly increased availability, reduced wait times, and 
increased the supply of free or low-cost contraceptives in affected communities.  Because 
federally funded programs did not require an explicit means test, they may have also reduced the 
costs of visits and supplies at private providers in the area. 
Less is known, however, about these programs’ day-to-day operations.  In the 1960s, 
programs were subjected to little oversight from the federal government.  Not only is information 
on all federal programs sparse in this period, but officials rarely spoke about this largely taboo 
topic.  In an evaluation of the War on Poverty, Sar Levitan (1969, p. 209) wrote that, “Contrary 
to the usual OEO tactic of trying to secure the maximum feasible visibility for all its activities, 
OEO prohibited [family planning] grantees from using program funds to ‘announce or promote 
through mass media the availability of the family planning program funded by this grant.’”6  The 
implication is that the treatment effect of these grants can be understood as one of increasing 
federal funding for “family planning,” rather than the effect of a particular, homogeneous 
intervention. 
Figure 3.1 presents the rollout of the first federal family planning grants from 1965 to 
1973.  Counties that received federal grants in this period (shaded on map; we call these counties 
“funded”) were more likely to be in cities and, consequently, differed in a number of their 
observable dimensions (Bailey 2012, Table 1).  Data from the 1960 census indicates that roughly 
60 percent of the U.S. population of women ages 15 to 44 lived in funded counties.  Funded 
counties were more urban, had more elderly residents, and were more educated and affluent than 
were unfunded counties.  Interestingly, funded and unfunded counties had a similar share of 
residents under age 5 in 1960, suggesting little difference in fertility rates in these areas before 
                                                 
6 The fact that the OEO might fund birth control was contentious before the EOA passed.  For instance, on April 18, 
1964, Eve Edstrom in the Washington Post (p. A4) reported the controversy on this topic between Representative 
Phil M. Landrum (D-Ga.), the House sponsor of the EOA, and Republican members of the special House Education 
and Labor subcommittee. 
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the passage of the EOA.  To account for time-invariant, area-level differences, our analysis 
includes area fixed effects.   
The different shades of gray in Figure 3.1 represent variation in the timing of each 
county’s first federal family planning grant.  Counties in the lightest shade of gray first received 
grants between 1965 and 1967; counties in the next darkest shade of gray first received grants 
between 1968 and 1969; counties shaded in black first received grants from 1970 to 1973.  
Although counties in each of the lower 48 states (i.e., excluding Alaska and Hawaii) received 
grants, the timing of program start dates varied considerably within states: in 43 states, programs 
were first funded in at least two different years; counties in 41 states first received funding in at 
least four different years; and, in more than half of all states, counties were first funded in at least 
five different years of the period considered. 
 
3.2.2  The Expected Effects of Family Planning Programs on Outcomes 
 
The potential effects of these family planning grants on children operate through several 
channels, each relating to their effects on fertility rates.  By providing cheaper, more reliable 
contraception and more convenient services, family planning should reduce ill-timed and 
unwanted childbearing.  Additionally, reductions in the price of averting births should increase 
the number of births that parents choose to avert or delay.7  Standard economic models and 
related empirical work motivate the following expected relationships between family planning 
policies and poverty rates.   
First, holding constant other uses of parents’ time, fewer children in a household at a 
given point in time implies an increase in the availability of parental time and economic 
resources per child.  Fewer children in a household should mechanically reduce poverty rates as 
a family with a given income is less likely to fall below the poverty threshold.   
Second, family planning programs may directly increase household income, thus 
reducing poverty rates.  Cheaper and more reliable contraception reduces the immediate and 
expected costs of delaying childbearing, freeing up resources for investment in the parents’ 
                                                 
7 Potentially offsetting this effect is the fact that cheaper and more reliable contraception should reduce 
precautionary undershooting as well (Michael and Willis 1976).  Estimates presented later suggest that reductions in 
childbearing have dominated empirically, so that greater access to cheaper and more reliable contraceptives tends to 
reduce family size. 
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human capital.  Delaying parenthood, even for just a year or two, could allow soon-to-be parents 
to get more education, work experience, and job training, and thus increase their lifetime 
earnings.  The results of empirical studies of teen access to the birth control pill are consistent 
with the claim that delaying childbearing has value.  Bailey et al. (2012) show that earlier access 
to the Pill increased women’s investment in their careers and, ultimately, their wages.  Hock 
(2008) shows that early access to the Pill increased men’s educational attainment as well.  
Family planning also reduces the price of delaying marriage (Goldin and Katz 2002) and can 
improve spousal matching, thereby reducing subsequent divorce rates (Christensen 2011, Rotz 
2011).  However, delaying childbearing does not necessarily yield economic benefits for 
mothers.  Hotz et al. (2005) show that women who became mothers as teenagers have slightly 
higher subsequent levels of employment and earnings than women of the same age who 
miscarried as teenagers. 
Third, family planning programs may affect the composition of parents by benefitting the 
lower income population.  Because higher income households could afford services at private 
medical providers, federally subsidized services may have disproportionately benefitted poorer 
families.  Consistent with this claim, Torres and Forrest (1985) document that, in 1983, family 
planning programs served almost 5 million Americans.  In the same year, roughly 83 percent of 
family planning patients had incomes below 150 percent of the poverty line, and 13 percent were 
recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC, the principal cash welfare 
program at the time).  Jaffe et al. (1973) report that 90 percent of all patients in organized family 
planning programs had household incomes of no more than 200 percent of the federal poverty 
line.  If poorer families elected to postpone childbearing or have fewer children, children born 
following the introduction of the programs would enjoy, on average, greater economic resources. 
Finally, parents’ investments in children may also be complemented by decreases in 
children’s cohort size.  Smaller cohorts could increase the public resources available per child 
and decrease competition for these limited resources (Easterlin 1978).  In schools, for instance, a 
decrease in cohort size might decrease class sizes, increase the likelihood of getting attention 
from teachers, and reduce classroom disruptions.  Changes in cohort size are unlikely to be 
accommodated fully by universities, a larger share of these smaller cohorts may be admitted to 
and complete college (Bound and Turner 2007).  Smaller cohort sizes may also affect the scale 
of markets for illicit drugs and other social “bads” and thereby reduce the incidence of related 
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crimes (Jacobson 2004).  Finally, smaller cohorts may reduce aggregate labor supply, decrease 
workers’ competition for firms’ resources, increase capital-labor ratios, and tend to raise wages. 
In summary, by increasing adults’ pre-childbearing human capital and by benefitting 
lower income families, family planning programs may increase children’s economic resources 
and decrease child poverty rates.  Under standard quality-quantity formulations, these changes 
would tend to increase parental investment in their children (Becker and Lewis 1973).  To the 
extent that family planning increases parental investment in children, it may improve their 
lifetime opportunities and labor market outcomes as adults.  Cohort-size effects tend to reinforce 
the positive effects of family planning. 
Note that these labor market channels—in addition to the within-household spillovers in 
family income and reductions in the price of child quality—suggest that the consequences of 
family planning may extend beyond the children immediately affected.  Access to family 
planning may benefit slightly older or younger children in the affected households, children in 
unaffected households in the same cohort, and children in slightly older or younger cohorts in the 
same labor market.  Because our research design compares the outcomes of children who were 
born in the years leading up to and just after the first funding for federal family planning 
programs began, this framework implicitly treats the older siblings of children born just before 
the family planning program as part of the comparison group.  We expect, therefore, that our 
results understate the effects of family planning programs. 
 
3.3  Data and Research Design 
 
Our analysis integrates the approach of Gruber et al. (1999), who study the impact of 
legalizing abortion on children’s economic resources, and Bailey (2012), who studies the impact 
of funding family planning programs on fertility rates.  We use three separate datasets to 
document effects at different stages by race: Vital Statistics data on fertility rates by race; the 
1980 decennial census which contains information on poverty rates among the affected cohorts 
in childhood; and a pooled sample of the 2000 decennial census and 2005–2011 American 
Community Surveys (ACS) which contains information on poverty rates among the affected 
cohorts in adulthood.  Our data have been collapsed to birth year × area × year of observation 
cells, indexed as t, j, and c, respectively.  Geographic area is defined either as a county (in the 
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Vital Statistics data), county group of residence (in the 1980 decennial census), or a public use 
microdata area of residence (PUMA, in the 2000 census and 2005–2011 ACS).   
Our research design compares poverty outcomes in childhood and adulthood between 
cohorts born before and after their area of birth/residence was first funded within the following 
linear difference-in-differences specification, 
 
𝑌𝑗,𝑡,𝑐 = 𝜏𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐹𝑃𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑿𝑗,𝑡,𝑐
′ 𝜷 + 𝜃𝑗,𝑐 + 𝛾𝑠(𝑗),𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡,𝑐 ,                               (1) 
 
where Y is a poverty rate and 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐹𝑃𝑗,𝑡 = 1(𝑡 > 𝑇𝑗
∗) is equal to 1 for areas observed after the 
first fiscal year family planning programs were funded (𝑇𝑗
∗).8  Other covariates include either 
area × year fixed effects (in the 2000 census and 2005–2011 ACS) or area fixed effects (Vital 
Statistics and 1980 decennial census), 𝜃, to account for within year, area-level differences; a set 
of year fixed effects or state-by-birth-cohort fixed effects that capture changes in state policies 
such as the staggered legalization of abortion and the state-level roll-out of Medicaid, .  X is a 
set of covariates which are discussed in later sections.   
The estimates of interest, τ, capture the average change in outcomes between individuals 
whose mothers would have had access to a family planning program before childbirth and 
individuals in the same area whose mothers would have conceived them before federal family 
planning grants began.  In all specifications, estimates are unweighted to minimize the 
importance of measurement error due to mobility (migration in and out of cities is much higher 
than in smaller areas).  (See also Solon et al. 2013.)  Additionally, we present cluster-robust 
standard errors, which account for an arbitrary covariance structure within each area across birth 
years (Arellano 1987, Bertrand et al. 2004). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 For simplicity in our later exposition, we refer to the year family planning programs were funded as the date they 
began.  The date of the first grant is not technically the date these clinics began operating, but the date of the first 
grant serves as a close proxy. 
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3.3.1  Support for Key Identifying Assumptions 
 
A central assumption of this paper’s research design is that the roll-out of family planning 
programs is unrelated to other determinants of childbearing or child outcomes.  Evidence for this 
assumption comes from both historical accounts and quantitative evidence.  According to oral 
histories, the “wild sort of grant-making operation” during the period provides a plausibly 
exogenous shock to the availability of local family planning services (Gillette 1996, p. 193).  
Bailey (2012) also provides quantitative support for this assumption.  She shows that, although 
family planning programs were funded earlier in areas with greater urban populations, neither 
1960 census characteristics, 1964 fertility levels, 1960 to 1964 fertility changes, nor a rich set of 
1965 measures of sexual behavior, birth control use, and childbearing predict when federal 
family planning programs began.  She also shows that the timing of the first family planning 
grant appears unrelated to changes in the funding for other War on Poverty programs.   
Another key assumption underlying this paper’s empirical strategy is that federal funding 
of family planning meaningfully increased the use of family planning services in the affected 
areas.  This assumption is difficult to test explicitly, but administrative reports suggest that the 
number of users of federally funded family planning services increased from zero in 1965 to 
around 1.2 million in 1969 and nearly 5 million in 1983.   
Further evidence of these programs’ relevance comes from their relationship to 
reductions in local fertility rates.  Bailey’s main findings also support this claim.  Before federal 
funding of family planning programs, the trend in the general fertility rate was similar in counties 
that would eventually receive funding and in those that would not (the pretreatment differences 
are close to zero and individually and jointly statistically insignificant).  However, fertility rates 
fell sharply in the funded counties after the family planning grants began.  Within 3 years of the 
grant, the general fertility rate had fallen by roughly 1 birth per 1,000 women of childbearing age 
in these counties on average.  By years 6 to 10, it had fallen by an average of 1.5 births per 1,000 
women.  Fifteen years after an organization received its first federal family planning grant, the 
fertility rate in funded counties remained 1.4 to 2 percent lower than in the year of first grant 
receipt, net of declines in fertility in other counties in the same state and after adjusting for 
observable county-level characteristics.  These findings are robust to variations in the 
specification: omitting unfunded counties, not weighting the regressions, and including county-
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level linear time trends.  In addition, the effects are similar for programs funded before and after 
Title X began in 1970. 
Using Vital Statistics birth certificate records that report mother’s county of residence, 
we provide further evidence on the fertility effects of family planning grants by crude race 
categories consistently available in this period: white and nonwhite.  Due to incomplete reporting 
of fertility rates by race in the early 1960s, our sample begins in 1968 with the natality microdata 
files (NCHS 2003).  For our fertility analyses, we drop counties that received their first family 
planning grant before 1968, so our post-grant estimates capture changes in fertility rates for a 
consistent group of counties.  Our overall sample, which aggregates across racial groups, 
includes 2,633 counties, 514 of which received a federal family planning grant (we call these 
“funded counties”).  The subsample of these counties that allows disaggregation by race (white 
and nonwhite in this period) consists of 1,481 counties, 197 of which were funded.  The Vital 
Statistics contain information on county of mother’s residence for each birth, which makes it 
possible to compare the results for different estimators and samples.   
In practice, 𝜃𝑗  in equation 1 consists of a set of county fixed effects, and X includes 
county covariates for the number of abortion providers, which account for within-state changes 
in the provision of abortion from 1970 to 1979 and annual information on per capita measures of 
government transfers from the Bureau of Economic Analysis Regional Information System 
(REIS) (cash public assistance benefits such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children, 
Supplemental Security Income, and General Assistance; medical spending such as Medicare and 
military health care; and cash retirement and disability payments).  In addition, X includes 1960 
county covariates interacted with a linear trend.9  Finally, 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐹𝑃𝑗,𝑡 is replaced with dummy 
variables for three birth cohort categories: cohorts born 5 to 1 years before the family planning 
program began; cohorts born 1 to 15 years after funding began, and cohorts born 16 to 20 years 
after funding began.  The sample consists of a balanced set of counties, while the control group 
consists of the cohort born at the time of first grant in funded counties and all cohorts in 
                                                 
9 The interactions of county covariates are identical to those in Almond et al. (2011) and include share of population 
in urban area, nonwhite, under age five, over age 64; share of households with income under $3000; and the share of 
the county’s land that is rural or a farm.  We are grateful to Doug Almond, Hilary Hoynes, and Diane Schanzenbach 
for providing the REIS data and to the Guttmacher Institute and Ted Joyce for providing the data on abortion 
providers.  Because information on abortion providers is not available at the county level before 1973, we follow 
Joyce et al. (2013) in assuming the number of providers in 1970 to 1972 in states that legalized before Roe v. Wade 
are identical to the number observed in 1973.  Note that changes in the distance to states providing legal abortion 
before 1970 are accounted for in the state-by-birth-year fixed effects.   
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unfunded counties.  We report estimates of the effect of federally funded family planning on 
cohorts born 1 to 15 years after the family planning program was first funded.   
Table 3.1 shows the relationship between family planning grants and fertility rates (τ) for 
all individuals (panel A), whites (panel B) and nonwhites (panel C).  Columns labeled (1) use a 
sample of all counties and include county, year, and state-by-year fixed effects; columns labeled 
(2) add county-level covariates to the samples in columns labeled (1).  The results for all 
individuals suggest a relationship between family planning programs and fertility rates similar to 
those reported in Bailey (2012), even though programs funded before 1968 are dropped and the 
sample only covers years 1968 to 1988 (not 1959 to 1988).  One to 15 years after counties first 
received federal family planning funding, fertility rates remained 2.3 births lower per 1,000 
women of childbearing age—a reduction of 2.5 percent over the pre-program mean in funded 
counties and the overall mean for unfunded counties.10   
Panels B and C of Table 3.1 present the relationship between family planning programs 
and fertility rates by race.  For both whites and nonwhites, the introduction of family planning is 
associated with declines in fertility rates.  Using the column 2 specification, the white fertility 
rate was about 2.1 percent lower in the 15 years after first federal funding of family planning 
programs, and the nonwhite fertility rate was about 1.4 percent lower.  For nonwhites, however, 
these estimates are imprecise and not statistically different from zero.   
In summary, these results support previous findings that the introduction of federally 
funded family planning programs—and the increase in the availability of family planning 
services they engendered—is associated with reduced fertility rates.  Next, our analysis examines 
the relationship between family planning programs and child poverty. 
 
3.4  Poverty Rates among Affected Cohorts in Childhood 
 
We use measures of child poverty from the 5-percent 1980 Integrated Public Use 
Microdata Series (IPUMS, Ruggles et al. 2010) sample of the U.S. decennial census.  These data 
have several advantages for the purposes of our analysis.  First, they provide large sample sizes 
                                                 
10 Restricting the sample to funded counties only, however, reduces the magnitudes of these estimates and they 
become statistically insignificant.  Although the estimates remain negative, they are a fraction of the size in Table 
1A, which suggests that using funded only counties (as we do in subsequent analyses) may understate the overall 
impact of the program. 
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and allow us to compute for each area and birth cohort and race the share of children in families 
below 100 percent and 200 percent of the poverty line.  A second advantage is that information 
on county group in the 1980 census (the lowest level of geographic identification in the IPUMS 
files) allows us to link the location of family planning programs to individuals in areas smaller 
than states.11  
These data, however, also have limitations for the purposes of this analysis, because they 
only provide geographic information at the county group level.  County groups in the continental 
U.S. are typically contiguous agglomerations of counties, but some counties are split between 
different county groups or are noncontiguous.  This limits our ability to link covariates to county 
groups and match them to family planning grant information.  For this reason, we restrict our 
sample to county groups that consist only of contiguous counties and that do not contain split 
counties.  Ongoing work by Bailey et al. (2013) uses the 1970 and 1980 restricted census 
samples that consist of 16 and 20 percent samples of the population and include the county of 
residence information.  This allows them to provide more precise estimates of the effect of first 
family planning program grants and to link all households to family planning grants based on 
their county of residence.   
A further limitation of the geographic information in the public files is that county group 
at the time of the census may not accurately measure mothers’ county group around the time of 
conception.  This source of measurement error is empirically important: Bailey et al. (2013) find 
that migration-induced measurement error in access to family planning is greater in cities and 
increases in funded areas (relative to unfunded areas) after the first federal family planning grant.  
They demonstrate that using unweighted regressions and limiting the sample to funded areas 
generates similar implied reductions in fertility rates in the census as in the Vital Statistics data 
(compare to this paper’s Table 3.1) as a result of family planning program funding.  To reduce 
measurement error in access to family planning in our analysis, we also use unweighted 
regressions and limit the sample to funded county groups.  Out of 1,154 overall county groups, 
our final sample consists of 251 county groups that do not contain split or non-coterminous 
                                                 
11 We link county-level introduction of family planning to census county groups using a cross-walk generously 
provided by Elizabeth Cascio. 
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counties and that receive their first federal family planning funding at some point before 1974.  
Of these county groups, only 154 have sufficient observations on nonwhites for inclusion.12  
The final limitation of the 1980 IPUMS census derives from the fact that the unit of 
observation is a household.  The census does not measure outcomes of children not residing with 
their parents.  Because children often leave home around age 18, we limit our analysis to 
individuals under age 18, or birth cohorts born from 1963 to 1979.  The practical implication of 
this limitation is that our pre-trend in the 1980 census is very short and begins only two years 
before the first family planning grant.   
The data available in the 1980 public census files necessitate that we estimate a restricted 
version of equation 1.  Only one census year is used, so c is 1980 for all individuals, and 𝜃𝑗 is a 
set of county-group fixed effects.  X includes county group covariates for the number of abortion 
providers and annual information on per capita measures of government transfers from REIS 
(cash public assistance benefits such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children, Supplemental 
Security Income, and General Assistance; medical spending such as Medicare and military 
health care; and cash retirement and disability payments).  Finally, 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐹𝑃𝑗,𝑡 is replaced with 
dummy variables for three birth cohort categories: cohorts born 10 to 3 years before the family 
planning program began and cohorts born 1 to 6 years and 7 to 14 years after the family planning 
program began.  The comparison group in this analysis is the cohort born in event years 2 to 0, 
which is observed for all county groups in the analysis.  We report coefficients for the 1 to 6 
years post funding category, because they are based on a balanced set of county groups.   
Access to affordable family planning may lead to lower poverty rates by permitting 
families to adjust their childbearing decisions in a way that raises their family income.  Table 3.1 
shows that family planning grants allowed women to defer childbearing.  As we discussed 
previously, the share of children in poverty may decrease following the introduction of a family 
planning program due to smaller family sizes, parents’ accumulation of more human capital, 
work experience, higher earning mates, or a change in the income composition of parents.   
Table 3.2 presents the estimated relationship between funding for family planning and 
child poverty rates.  Panel A shows the share of children living in families below the poverty line 
and panel B shows the share of children living in families below twice the poverty line.  The 
                                                 
12 We also exclude Virginia from the analysis, because so many of its counties changed boundaries over the 1970s 
making it difficult to merge county groups with appropriate covariates. 
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results suggest that children born after family planning programs were funded were less likely to 
live in poverty.  Children born 1 to 6 years after funding were 0.76 percentage points less likely 
to live in poverty than the children born before the federal funding began—a reduction of 4.2 
percent (from a mean poverty rate of 18.2 percent for children born 0 to 2 years before funding 
began).  These results are robust across specifications that include county group, year and state-
by-year fixed effects (column 1) and the addition of county group level controls (column 2). 
Federal family planning programs expanded access to and affordability of family 
planning particularly to disadvantaged individuals.  Whether white or nonwhite children 
experienced greater reductions in poverty depends on how family planning influenced parents’ 
use of their services and also how parents using these services changed their economic 
circumstances.  Different relationships between family planning and poverty rates by race may 
also result from differences in access to education, job training, or spousal matching for mothers, 
for instance.  To examine these differences, we perform our analysis by crude categories for race 
to correspond to those categories available in the Vital Statistics data on births.  Although both 
white and nonwhite children were significantly less likely to live in poverty, the reduction was 
largest among nonwhite children.  Column 3 shows that white children are 0.56 percentage 
points less likely to live in poverty, a reduction of 4.1 percent from a mean of 13.7 percent.  
Column 4 shows that nonwhite children are 3.2 percentage points less likely to live in poverty, a 
reduction of 8.3 percent from a mean of 38.7 percent.   
A second (and related) hypothesis is that family planning programs would affect more 
disadvantaged families more, because they are substantially more likely to gain from access to 
affordable contraception.  Consistent with this hypothesis, the relative reductions in the share of 
children below two times the poverty line are generally smaller than the reductions in the share 
of children living below the poverty line.  Family planning programs are associated with a 
reduction in the share of children living near poverty, particularly among nonwhite children.  
Panel B shows that the share of children below two times the poverty line also fell.  The relative 
reductions for all, white and nonwhite children are smaller than the reductions in the share of 
children living in poverty and the estimates are no longer statistically significant.  Compared to 
white children, the reduction in the share of nonwhite children living near poverty is both 
absolutely and relatively larger.  Nonwhite children born after family planning programs began 
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were 3.0 percent less likely to live below two times the poverty line while white children were 
1.1 percent less likely to live below two times the poverty line. 
 
3.5  Poverty Rates among Affected Cohorts in Adulthood 
 
A final analysis investigates the long-run relationship between a mother’s access to 
family planning services and the adult outcomes of the affected children.  Children born after the 
funding of family planning programs may have been part of smaller families and cohorts, were 
less likely to grow up in poverty, and, consequently, may have benefitted from greater parental 
and societal investments.  The accumulation of these changes in childhood circumstances 
suggests these cohorts may have been less likely to live in poverty as adults. 
We use the 5-percent, public use sample of the 2000 decennial census and the 2005–2011 
ACS (Ruggles et al. 2010) to investigate this hypothesis.  An advantage of these data for the 
purposes of our analysis is that they allow the inclusion of a long pre-trend of cohorts, as 
information on poverty status exists even if individuals do not live with their parents.  Our 
sample, therefore, includes individuals born from 1946 to 1980 who were ages 20 to 59 when 
observed.  We choose these age limits to capture the labor market outcomes of workers after they 
have left home and before they have retired.   
A disadvantage of these data is that they do not contain information on the county in 
which individuals were born.  As in the analysis of the 1980 IPUMS data, we proxy for county of 
birth using the Public Use Microdata Area (PUMA) of residence at the time of observation.13  
The role of misclassification error induced by this data limitation is difficult to assess without 
national data on lifetime migration.  In the absence of systematic changes in migration, we 
expect that misclassification error introduced by using PUMA of residence should tend to work 
against finding results.  On the other hand, using PUMAs rather than counties for longer-term 
outcomes may reduce misclassification error if, for instance, using a slightly larger area 
improves the assignment of mothers’ access to family planning (that is, more of the individuals 
remain in the PUMA of birth than lived in their county of birth).  As in the analysis of the 1980 
                                                 
13 PUMAS are the finest consistent geographic detail available for all individuals in the publicly-available versions 
of these data.  There are 2,069 distinct PUMAs, each with a population of 100,000 or more, and, unlike county 
groups, PUMAs do not cross state borders. 
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census, we estimate unweighted regressions and include only the 1,269 PUMAs that received a 
family planning grant before 1974 to limit the role of misclassification error.14 
Our specification of equation 1 is similar to the analysis using 1980 IPUMS data with 
several exceptions.  First, we use multiple survey years, so c equals 2000, 2005, 2006, …, 2011.  
Pooling multiple years yields observations on the same cohorts at different ages, so we include 
age and age squared as covariates in X.  Second, due to the difficulty of mapping county 
characteristics onto PUMAs, we cannot include other covariates in the analysis.  Third, 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐹𝑃𝑗,𝑡 is replaced with dummy variables for three birth cohort categories: cohorts born 27 to 
14 years before family planning programs began; cohorts born 1 to 7 years and cohorts born 8 to 
15 years after family planning programs began.  We omit cohorts born 13 to zero years before 
family planning programs began, so this category becomes our comparison group.  Estimates for 
the first and last categories are suppressed in the presentation in Table 3.3, because they are 
estimated using only a subset of cohorts. 
Table 3.3 shows that within cohort changes in funding of federal family planning 
programs are associated with significant reductions in adult poverty rates among cohorts born 
after the programs began.15  Many individuals in cohorts born before first funding of family 
planning programs transitioned out of poverty between childhood and adulthood: 18 percent of 
these cohorts lived in poverty in childhood, while 12 percent lived in poverty in adulthood.  We 
provide evidence that this transition was significantly greater among cohorts born after family 
planning programs began.  Table 3.3 shows that the share of adults in poverty (panel A) and the 
share of adults with family income below two times the poverty line (panel B) fell significantly 
for the affected cohorts.  Relative to individuals born in the  years prior to when family planning 
programs began, individuals born in the seven subsequent years were 0.28 percentage points less 
likely to live in poverty as adults, a reduction of 2.4 percent over the pre-program mean of 11.5 
percent.  This result is unaltered with the inclusion of age and age-squared controls in column 2.   
Following our analysis of child poverty, we also examine reductions in near poverty.  The 
effect of funding family planning programs on the share of adults living near poverty is similar to 
                                                 
14 Some PUMAs overlap multiple counties.  The count of PUMAs that contain funded programs exceeds that of 
counties because we treat each PUMA that overlaps with a funded county as having received a family planning 
grant in the same year as the county. 
15 We borrow from the US census the definition of poverty that uses a family income threshold that depends on the 
number of overall family members and the number of children (Dalaker and Proctor 2000).  For instance, the 
poverty threshold for the annual income of a household of four is $23,550 in 2013 dollars. 
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the effect on the share of adults living in poverty.  Panel B of Table 3.3 shows that cohorts born 
after family planning programs were funded were 2.4 percent less likely to live below two times 
the poverty line as adults, relative to cohorts born before funding began but residing in the same 
PUMA.  In addition, we find that the mean long-run effects are slightly stronger (though not 
statistically so) among whites.  White cohorts born after the introduction of family planning were 
4.8 percent (0.97 percentage points) less likely to live below two times the poverty line.  The 
same statistic was 2 percent among nonwhite cohorts.  This striking relationship between family 
planning programs and poverty rates decades later suggests that family planning programs may 
reduce poverty rates, both in the short and longer term. 
 
3.6  Conclusions 
 
In 2012, approximately one in five U.S. children lived below the official poverty line, 
only slightly lower than in 1965.  The persistence of child poverty and its potentially negative 
consequences for children’s opportunities has made reducing child poverty a public policy 
concern.  While the majority of Americans have higher incomes than their parents, children with 
parents in the lowest income quintile experience the lowest absolute increase in income through 
adulthood (Pew Charitable Trusts 2012).  In fact, 43 percent of all children and 50 percent of 
black children with parents in the bottom income quintile remain in the bottom income quintile 
as adults.   
Our findings suggest the potential of family planning programs to disrupt this cycle of 
disadvantage.  Individuals born after family planning programs began were 4.2 percent less 
likely to live in poverty in childhood and were 2.4 percent less likely to live in poverty as adults, 
than individuals born just before family planning programs began and residing in the same 
location. 
A simple calculation relies on our estimates to approximate some of the costs and 
benefits of spending on family planning programs.  On the benefit side, we multiply the number 
of children in funded county groups in 1980 who were born after family planning programs were 
funded by our estimate in Table 3.2 in panel A of column 2.  This calculation implies that 79,800 
fewer children (0.0076 × 10.5 million) lived below the poverty line in 1980 than would have in 
the absence of the program.  To approximate the number of adults who escaped poverty as a 
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result of these programs, we multiply the number of adults ages 20 to 59 living in funded 
PUMAs in 2000 who were born after program funding by the coefficient in Table 3.3 in panel A 
of column 2 which yields 46,760 adults (0.0028 × 16.7 million).  Between 1964 and 1973, the 
federal government spent approximately $2.6 billion (in 2010 dollars) on family planning grants.  
This implies that each child lifted out of poverty cost approximately $32,581, while the long-run 
cost of each adult lifted out of poverty was $55,603.   
Of course, these calculations likely misstate the effects of family planning for several 
reasons.  First, siblings and slightly older and younger cohorts may also benefit from the 
programs and they contaminate the comparison group.  Second, the mismeasurement of family 
planning status of parents (due to migration) should lead us to misstate the relationship of 
interest, and understate it if measurement error is unrelated to access to family planning.  Finally, 
using only changes in poverty rates ignores many of the other consequences of family planning 
programs, which extend to population growth and labor supply, higher education, labor force 
participation, and wages (Bailey 2013).  Nevertheless, even these conservative estimates of the 
cost per child or adult exiting poverty suggest that family planning programs could improve 
economic outcomes over the longer term. 
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Table 3.1: The Effect of Family Planning on Fertility Rates, by Race 
 
 Dependent Variable: Fertility Rates (Births per 1,000 Women Ages 15–44) 
 A. All Individuals  B. White  C. Nonwhite 
  (1) (2)  (1) (2)  (1) (2) 
Mean in Funded Counties 
Before Funding Began 
90 90 
 
83 83 
 
122 122 
After Family Planning  -2.75 -2.26 
 
-1.96 -1.73 
 
-1.28 -1.72 
Program Funding Began  [0.43] [0.40]  [0.47] [0.45]  [1.63] [1.63] 
R2 0.56 0.57 
 
0.52 0.53 
 
0.30 0.31 
Counties 2,633 2,633  1,481 1,481  1,481 1,481 
Observations 55,293 55,293  31,101 31,101  31,101 31,101 
County FE Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Birth year FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
State × birth year FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
County characteristics 
 
Yes  
 
Yes  
 
Yes 
 
Notes: The unit of observation is county by year, and estimates of 𝜏 are presented using equation 1.  The results use the funded 
and unfunded sample of counties.  Estimates are not weighted.  Columns labeled (1) include county, year, and state by year fixed 
effects, while columns labeled (2) add county covariates (1960 county covariates interacted with a linear trend, number of 
abortion providers, and REIS controls).  Panel A presents results for both races, panel B presents results for whites only, and 
panel C presents results for nonwhites only.  Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by county are presented beneath 
each estimate in brackets.  Source: Vital Statistics. 
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Table 3.2: The Effect of Family Planning on Next Generation Childhood Poverty, by Race 
 
 All Individuals  White  Nonwhite 
 (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
A. Dependent Variable: Percent with Family Income < Poverty Line 
Mean in Funded Counties 
Before Funding Began 
18.2 18.2  13.7  38.7 
After Family Planning -0.81 -0.76  -0.56  -3.16 
Program Funding Began [0.31] [0.32]  [0.30]  [1.22] 
R2 0.27 0.28  0.26  0.30 
 
B. Dependent Variable: Percent with Family income < Two Times the Poverty Line 
Mean in Funded Counties 
Before Funding Began 
42.9 42.9  37.0  69.7 
After Family Planning -0.45 -0.50  -0.40  -2.09 
Program Funding Began [0.41] [0.42]  [0.44]  [1.16] 
R2 0.47 0.47  0.47  0.31 
County Group FE Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Birth year FE 
State × birth year FE 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes  
Yes 
Yes  
Yes 
Yes 
County Characteristics  Yes  Yes  Yes 
County Groups 251 251  251  154 
Observations 4,267 4,267  4,267  2,618 
 
Notes: The unit of observation is county group by year, and estimates of 𝜏 are presented using equation 1.  The results use the 
funded only sample.  We classify as “white” all individuals in the census who list their race as “white”, while “nonwhite” 
comprises all other individuals.  We drop county groups where fewer than 50 nonwhite children were born in any year in the 
analysis.  We drop non-coterminous county groups and county groups that contain split counties.  We define the share in poverty 
as the share of children who live in families whose income is below the poverty threshold, we also compute the share of children 
who live in families whose income is below 200 percent of the poverty threshold.  Column 1 presents results for both races and 
includes county group, birth year, and state by birth year fixed effects; column 2 adds county characteristics (number of abortion 
providers and REIS controls) to column 1; column 3 presents results for whites only and includes county group, birth year, state 
by birth year fixed effects, and county characteristics; column 4 presents results for nonwhites only and adds the same controls as 
column 3.  Panel A presents results when using the share of children living in families whose income is below 100 percent of the 
poverty line as a dependent variable.  Panel B presents results when using the share of children living in families whose income is 
below twice the poverty line as a dependent variable.  Estimates are not weighted.  Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
clustered by county are presented beneath each estimate in brackets.  Source: 1980 Integrated Public Use Microdata Series. 
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Table 3.3: The Effect of Family Planning on Next Generation Adult Poverty, by Race  
 
 All Individuals  White  Nonwhite 
 (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
A. Dependent Variable: Percent with Family Income < Poverty Line 
Mean in Funded Counties 
Before Funding Began 
11.5 11.5  8.18  16.4 
After Family Planning -0.28 -0.28  -0.50  -0.32 
Program Funding Began [0.12] [0.18]  [0.14]  [0.28] 
R2 0.05 0.06  0.02  0.03 
 
B. Dependent Variable: Percent with Family income < Two Times the Poverty Line 
Mean in Funded Counties 
Before Funding Began 
27.9 27.9  20.4  38.1 
After Family Planning -0.68 -0.68  -0.97  -0.76 
Program Funding Began [0.18] [0.18]  [0.21]  [0.34] 
R2 0.13 0.13  0.06  0.05 
PUMA × observation year FE Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Birth year FE 
State × birth year FE 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes  
Yes 
Yes  
Yes 
Yes 
Age and age2  Yes  Yes  Yes 
PUMAs 1,268 1,268  1,268  1,268 
Observations 328,403 328,403  320,634  298,216 
 
Notes: We classify as “white” all individuals recorded in the census as belonging to no other racial group and not being Hispanic, 
while “nonwhite” comprises all other individuals.  There were 2,072 PUMAs in the fifty US states in 2000.  Following 
population displacement in Louisiana due to Hurricane Katrina, three PUMAs (1801, 1802, and 1905) were combined, and we 
merge these PUMAs together throughout the entire 2000–2011 sample period.  Additionally, we drop PUMA 5423 in Los 
Angeles because it has few white residents, for none of whom poverty status is recorded.  Our final sample consists of 1,268 
PUMAs whose boundaries include all or part of county in which an family planning grant began between 1965 and 1973 and in 
which poverty status was measured for at least one white and at least one nonwhite resident age 20–59 and born 1946–1980 in 
each of the eight years of observation (yielding 10,144 unique combinations of PUMA × year of observation).  This figure of 
1,268 PUMAs exceeds the tally of 654 counties with a grant because, while a single PUMA may span several counties, so too 
may a single county span several PUMAs.  Finally, we average poverty status across all individuals, and separately by race for 
those who reside in the same PUMA, share the same year of birth, and are observed in the same year.  The units of analysis are 
328,403 PUMA × year of birth × year of observation cells.  Not every cell contains both white and nonwhite individuals for 
whom poverty status is recorded, so the actual number of units is slightly smaller for the race-specific specifications (3) and (4).  
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by PUMA and observation year are presented beneath each estimate in 
brackets.  The mean in funded counties before funding began is the average across individuals born two years prior to funding to 
those born in the year of funding.  Estimates are not weighted.  Source: 2000 US Decennial Census and 2005–2011 American 
Community Surveys. 
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Figure 3.1: The Date of the First Federal Family Planning Grant, 1965–1973 
 
 
 
Notes: Dates are the year that the county first received a federal grant.  Counties not receiving a family planning 
grant between 1965 and 1973, including communities that received funding but with an unknown starting date, are 
not shaded.  Source: NACAP, NAFO and OEO (1969, 1971 and 1974). 
